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ABSTRACT	
Potentially	 polluting	 shipwrecks	 containing	 oil	 or	 other	 hazardous	 substances	 pose	 a	
threat	to	the	marine	environment.	This	is	a	global	problem	and	many	shipwrecks	stem	
from	the	Second	World	War	having	been	deteriorating	on	the	sea	floor	since	then. Only	in	
Swedish	waters	more	than	300	wrecks	are	estimated	to	pose	an	environmental	threat.	
Together,	 these	wrecks	 are	 estimated	 to	 contain	 between	1,000	 and	15,000	 tonnes	 of	
bunker	oil.	Every	shipwreck	poses	a	unique	case	depending	on,	for	example,	the	type	of	
vessel,	cause	of	sinking,	and	environmental	preconditions.	This	implies	that	the	problem	
is	complex	and	also	that	there	are	many	uncertainties	involved.			
It	 is	not	 feasible	 to	remediate	all	 shipwrecks	due	 to	 large	costs,	but	a	proactive	
approach	would	 reduce	 the	 need	 for	 and	 high	 costs	 of	 reactive	 response	 in	 case	 of	 a	
discharge.		Until	now,	there	were	no	comprehensive	probabilistic	method	for	assessing	
the	environmental	 risk	posed	by	 shipwrecks	 in	order	 to	provide	necessary	 support	 to	
decision‐makers.	
In	 order	 to	 prioritise	 and	 effectively	 use	 resources,	 proper	 decision	 support	 is	
needed.	 Risk	 assessments	 and	 the	 overall	 process	 of	 risk	management	 are	 important	
means	to	provide	such	decision	support.	The	purpose	of	this	thesis	has	therefore	been	to	
develop,	apply	and	evaluate	a	model	 for	comprehensive	risk	assessment	of	potentially	
polluting	shipwrecks.	A	comparison	of	current	methods	for	risk	assessment	of	shipwrecks	
was	 performed	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 development	 needs.	 Based	 on	 the	 comparison,	 a	
generic	 framework	 for	risk	management	of	 shipwrecks	was	suggested.	Furthermore,	a	
method	 for	 estimating	 the	 probability	 of	 discharge	 of	 hazardous	 substances	 was	
developed,	 using	 a	 probabilistic	 fault	 tree	 method.	 The	 method	 makes	 it	 possible	 to	
consider	 possible	 activities	 that	 may	 damage	 the	 wreck	 as	 well	 as	 physical	 and	
environmental	conditions	affecting	the	wreck.	An	approach	for	consequence	assessment	
of	 discharges	 from	 shipwrecks,	 consisting	 of	 an	 aggregation	 of	 methods	 was	 also	
developed	within	this	thesis	work.	
The	 generic	 framework	 for	 risk	 management	 of	 shipwrecks	 clearly	 shows	 the	
important	steps	required	and	how	they	are	linked.	It	also	emphasizes	the	need	of	proper	
assessments	to	facilitate	prioritisation	of	shipwrecks	and	an	efficient	resource	allocation	
for	these	environmental	threats.	The	result	is	a	probabilistic	and	comprehensive	model	
for	 risk	 assessment	 of	 shipwrecks	 including	 possibilities	 to	 cope	 with	 the	 vast	
uncertainties	involved	in	shipwreck	risk	assessment.		
	
	
Keywords:	 	 environmental	 risk	 assessment,	 shipwreck,	 fault	 tree	 analysis,	 decision	
support,	Bayesian	updating	
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1. Introduction	
The	ability	to	identify	adverse	events	that	might	possibly	occur	in	the	future,	and	to	make	
good	 and	 relevant	 choices	 from	 among	 alternative	 actions	 that	 could	 be	 employed	 to	
manage	such	events,	is	a	key	factor	in	modern	society.	Understanding	risk	thus	allows	us	
to	make	rational	decisions	(Bernstein,	1996).	Limited	societal	resources	combined	with	
numerous	potential	areas	of	need	for	these	resources	imply	that	prioritisation	decisions	
are	required.	One	of	these	resource‐demanding	areas	is	environmental	protection	and	a	
specific	area	that	has	attracted	growing	attention	is	the	problem	of	potentially	polluting	
shipwrecks.	
	
Polluting	 shipwrecks	 are	 a	 global	 and	 multi‐faceted	 problem.	 Estimates	 indicate	 that	
several	thousand	wrecks	litter	the	ocean	floors	(Michel	et	al.,	2005).	In	Swedish	waters	
alone,	2,700	wrecks	(≥	100	gross	tonnage)	warrant	further	investigation	and	more	than	
300	of	these	were	assumed	to	pose	an	environmental	threat	as	they	may	contain	1,000‐
15,000	 tonnes	 of	 bunker	 oil	 (Larsson	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 Many	 shipwrecks	 have	 been	
deteriorating	on	the	seabed	for	several	years	and	many	originate	from	the	Second	World	
War	 containing	 unknown	 amounts	 of	 oil	 and	 other	 hazardous	 substances.	 Oil	 can	 be	
present	both	as	bunker	and	cargo,	making	it	the	most	common	hazardous	substance	in	
wrecks.	 Assessing	 risks	 posed	 by	 shipwrecks	 requires	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 holistic	
perspective.	The	entire	chain	of	events,	from	wreck	condition	and	cargo	to	environmental	
conditions	at	the	wreck	site	and	external	factors,	must	be	taken	into	account	to	obtain	a	
relevant	grasp	of	the	problem.	The	threat	from	shipwrecks	requires	attention,	and	there	
is	 a	 need	 for	 guidance,	 decision‐making	 support	 and	 methods	 to	 assess	 and	 handle	
efficiently	 the	 environmental	 risks	 and	 facilitate	 resource	 allocation	 for	 mitigation	
measures	(Paper	I;	Michel	et	al.,	2005).		
	
The	environmental	risk	posed	by	each	wreck	is	unique	with	regard	to	the	probability	of	
leakage	and	its	potential	impact.	Each	vessel	will	respond	differently	to	external	forces	
and	environmental	conditions	are	specific	to	each	wreck	location	(Etkin	et	al.,	2009).	The	
effects	of	an	oil	discharge	from	a	shipwreck	will	depend	on	when	the	oil	is	released,	where	
the	 release	occurs,	 the	spreading	rate	of	 the	oil	 slick	and	 the	 type	of	oil	 (Michel	et	al.,	
2005).	 Oil	 discharged	 into	 a	marine	 environment	 is	 harmful	 to	 living	 organisms	 (e.g.	
Kingston,	2002;	Lindgren,	2015).	Oil	spills	can	also	cause	economic	damage	to	property	
and	market	 goods	 such	 as	 tourism	and	 fisheries	 as	well	 as	non‐market	 goods	 such	 as	
recreation	(Fejes	et	al.,	2011).	The	wide	variety	of	factors	influencing	a	potential	discharge	
implies	that	there	are	also	a	number	of	uncertainties	associated	with	risk	assessments	of	
H.	Landquist	 	
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shipwrecks,	and	hence	also	with	possible	measures	aimed	at	mitigating	the	risks	posed	
by	shipwrecks.	
	
Etkin	(2009)	argues	that	a	reactive	approach	to	oil	leakage	from	a	shipwreck	would	lead	
to	higher	response	and	damage	costs	compared	to	a	well‐planned,	proactive	oil	removal	
operation.	Nevertheless,	 it	 is	 very	 costly	 to	 remediate	 shipwrecks.	 It	 is	 estimated	 that	
remediation	 of	 one	wreck	 could	 cost	USD	1‐100	million	 (Michel	 et	 al.,	 2005)	 and	 it	 is	
therefore	not	 economically	 feasible	 to	 remediate	 every	 sunken	 shipwreck.	The	300	or	
more	wrecks	only	in	Sweden	mentioned	previously	would	cost	hundreds	of	millions	of	
dollars	to	remediate.	To	deal	with	the	problem	of	potentially	polluting	shipwrecks,	there	
is	 a	 vital	 need	 for	 decision	 support	methods	 to	 facilitate	 prioritisation	 of	wrecks	 and	
identification	of	how	available	resources	can	be	used	most	efficiently.	
	
Shipwreck	 risk	 assessment	 requires	 knowledge	 from	 many	 fields	 and	 collaboration	
between	 several	 bodies	 to	 make	 relevant	 decisions	 regarding	 potential	 mitigation	
measures.	 A	 key	 aspect	 of	 utilising	 available	 resources	 efficiently	 is	 to	 facilitate	
cooperation	 between	 these	 bodies.	 The	 responsible	 authorities,	 such	 as	 the	 Swedish	
Agency	for	Marine	and	Water	Management,	the	Maritime	Administration,	the	Coast	Guard,	
shipwreck	remediation	companies	and	researchers	in	Sweden	and	abroad,	are	just	some	
examples	of	potential	collaborative	organisations.		
	
An	important	means	of	providing	decision	support	is	to	apply	risk	assessment	practices	
that	 are	 widely	 employed	 in	 several	 disciplines,	 including	 engineering,	 ecotoxicology,	
public	 health	 and	 economics	 (Burgman,	 2005).	 Risk	 assessment	 is	 part	 of	 risk	
management	and	 includes	Risk	 identification,	Risk	analysis	 and	Risk	evaluation.	 Several	
approaches	 to	 risk	 assessment	 specific	 to	 shipwrecks	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 literature	
(Alcaro	et	al.,	2007;	Etkin	et	al.,	2009;	Idaas,	2005;	Louzis	et	al.,	2009;	Michel	et	al.,	2005;	
NOAA,	2009;	NOAA,	2013;	SPREP	and	SOPAC,	2002;	Ventikos	et	al.,	2013;	Ventikos	et	al.,	
2016).	 However,	 studies	 presented	 in	 this	 thesis	 show	 that	 current	 methods	 fail	 to	
provide	a	holistic	and/or	fully	probabilistic	risk	assessment	of	shipwrecks.	Consequently,	
it	could	result	 in	 inefficient	use	of	societal	resources	and	 inadequate	risk	mitigation	of	
potentially	polluting	shipwrecks	due	to	a	lack	of	well‐founded	decision	input.	
1.1. Aim	and	objectives	
The	overall	aim	of	this	thesis	was	to:	
	
Develop,	apply	and	evaluate	a	model	for	comprehensive	risk	assessment	of	potentially	
polluting	shipwrecks.	
	
To	meet	the	overall	aim,	the	following	specific	objectives	were	defined:	
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 Compare	and	analyse	identified	current	risk	assessment	methods	for	potentially	
polluting	 shipwrecks	 with	 regard	 to	 how	 these	 methods	 comply	 with	 an	
international	standard	for	risk	management.	
 Suggest	a	generic	framework	for	risk	management	and	assessment	of	shipwrecks,	
including	risk	identification,	risk	analysis	and	risk	evaluation.	
 Develop	 a	 method	 to	 quantitatively	 estimate	 the	 probability	 of	 discharge	 of	
hazardous	substances	from	shipwrecks.	
 Develop	an	approach	for	consequence	assessment	of	the	discharge	of	hazardous	
substances	from	shipwrecks	by	combining	existing	methods	for	oil	spill	modelling	
and	receptor	sensitivity.	
 Present	a	comprehensive	model	for	conducting	a	risk	assessment	of	shipwrecks,	
including	 a	 method	 for	 estimating	 the	 probability	 of	 discharge	 of	 hazardous	
substances	 and	 an	 approach	 for	 making	 a	 consequence	 assessment	 of	 such	 a	
discharge.	 The	 model	 should	 also	 provide	 a	 means	 for	 risk	 evaluation	 by	
comparison	with	acceptable	risk	levels	or	making	an	analysis	of	the	relationship	
between	risk	mitigation	and	cost.		
	
A	 structured	 framework	 for	 managing	 risks	 associated	 with	 shipwrecks	 provides	
necessary	guidance	on	the	important	steps	needed	to	handle	this	environmental	problem.	
Understanding	the	risk	arising	from	potentially	polluting	shipwrecks	also	entails	handling	
uncertainties.	To	cope	with	uncertainty,	a	quantitative	probabilistic	approach	is	applied	
by	 using	 a	 logic	 tree	 model	 for	 estimating	 the	 probability	 of	 discharge	 of	 hazardous	
substances.	An	expert	panel	was	also	involved	to	gather	information	on	uncertain	aspects	
of	 the	 probability	 of	 discharge.	 Release	 of	 hazardous	 substances	 into	 the	 marine	
environment	 will	 give	 rise	 to	 environmental	 consequences	 and	 implications	 in	
socioeconomic	 terms.	These	effects	must	be	addressed	and	a	consequence	assessment	
approach	is	therefore	developed.	A	comprehensive	model	for	making	a	risk	assessment	
of	potentially	polluting	shipwrecks	is	based	on	the	probability	estimation	method	and	the	
approach	to	consequence	assessment.	
1.2. Scope	of	work	
The	appended	papers	are	interlinked,	as	shown	in	Figure	1.	Paper	I	presents	a	literature	
review	of	existing	methods	for	risk	assessment	of	shipwrecks	and	suggests	a	generic	risk	
assessment	framework	for	wrecks.	The	paper	was	published	in	2013	and	since	then	three	
new	approaches	have	emerged	and	are	discussed	in	Chapter	3.	However,	the	main	finding	
of	the	paper	still	holds:	existing	approaches	lack	key	elements	of	a	holistic	risk	assessment	
for	shipwrecks.		
	
Papers	II	and	IV	describe	a	fault	tree	method	for	probabilistic	estimation	of	the	discharge	
of	 hazardous	 substances	 from	wrecks.	 This	 quantitative	method	 facilitates	 an	 explicit	
uncertainty	analysis.	A	generic	estimation	of	the	probability	of	an	opening	in	the	wreck	is	
updated	by	site‐specific	and	wreck‐specific	indicators,	e.g.	time	since	sinking,	salinity,	and	
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water	 temperature.	 A	 total	 probability	 of	 discharge	 is	 estimated	 by	 combining	 the	
probability	 of	 opening	 with	 the	 rate	 of	 hazardous	 activities	 and	 the	 probability	 that	
hazardous	substances	are	still	contained	in	the	wreck.	The	fault	tree	method	provides	the	
foundation	 for	 the	 VRAKA	 tool,	 an	 Excel‐based	 tool	 for	 estimating	 the	 probability	 of	
discharge	 from	 shipwrecks.	 Paper	 III	 presents	 the	 structure	 and	 outcomes	 of	 a	
comprehensive	 expert	 elicitation	 process	 that	 provided	 further	 input	 to	 the	 fault	 tree	
method.	Paper	 IV	makes	use	of	 these	results	and	novel	methodology	 for	 incorporating	
site‐specific	and	wreck‐specific	indicators	in	the	risk	model	is	presented.		
	
In	Paper	V,	a	comprehensive	model	for	making	a	risk	assessment	of	potentially	polluting	
shipwrecks	is	presented.	The	model	is	called	VRAKA	(the	Swedish	word	for	wrecking)	and	
comprises	the	VRAKA	method	for	probability	estimation	of	discharge	and	a	three‐tiered	
approach	for	a	consequence	assessment	of	such	a	discharge.	
	
VRAKA	is	developed	and	operationalised	in	the	spread	sheet	program	Microsoft	Excel©	
with	the	add‐in	software	Crystal	Ball©	for	Monte	Carlo	simulations.	The	VRAKA	Handbook	
is	appended	to	the	thesis	(A1).		
		
	
 
Figure	1.	Schematic	summary	of	the	scope	of	the	thesis	in	relation	to	the	appended	papers.	
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1.3. Limitations	
The	potential	risk	posed	by	shipwrecks	is	a	complex	problem	involving	risk	assessment	
and	management,	decision‐making	and	value‐based	judgement.	It	also	involves	a	
number	of	substances	in	wrecks	on	ocean	floors	all	over	the	world.	Encompassing	the	
full	complexity	of	shipwrecks	is	a	vast	endeavour	and	the	following	limitations	of	this	
work	need	to	be	highlighted:	
	
 The	suggested	framework	for	risk	management	and	assessment	of	shipwrecks	
describes	 the	 entire	 risk	 management	 process.	 However,	 the	 comparison	
between	the	identified	methods	focuses	on	risk	assessment,	as	does	the	VRAKA	
method.		
	
 The	framework	and	model	presented	in	this	thesis	are	intended	to	facilitate	a	
proactive	approach	and	specifically	the	risk	assessment	of	potentially	polluting	
shipwrecks	and	the	provision	of	decision	support	to	deal	with	these	risks.	The	
assessment	 results	 aim	 to	 support	 prioritisation	 of	 wrecks	 and	 decisions	
regarding	measures	for	preventing	leakage	of	oil,	although	the	actual	process	
of	 selecting	 and	 performing	 preventive	 options	 or	 monitoring	 applied	
measures	is	not	addressed	in	this	thesis.	
	
 There	are	shipwrecks	all	over	the	world	containing	a	wide	range	of	different	
hazardous	 substances.	 This	 thesis	 is	 focused	 on	 shipwrecks	 located	 in	
Scandinavian	 waters	 that	 contain	 oil.	 A	 wider	 geographical	 scope	 and	
expansion	to	other	substances	are	possible	future	developments.	The	method	
for	estimating	the	probability	of	discharge	is	not	restricted	to	a	specific	area	
but	it	should	be	pointed	out	that	the	expert	elicitation	process	that	provides	
input	is	made	using	experts	from	Sweden	and	is	based	on	the	Swedish	wreck	
population.	The	consequence	assessment	can	for	the	less	detailed	tiers	of	the	
VRAKA	method	be	performed	in	other	parts	of	 the	world	although	the	most	
elaborate	 tier	 is	only	applicable	 in	Sweden.	These	methods	provide	a	sound	
basis	for	further	development	for	other	locations.		
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2. 	Concepts	of	risk		
The	concepts	of	risk	as	we	see	them	today	originate	from	the	Hindu‐Arabic	numbering	
system	and	deeper	studies	that	took	place	during	the	Renaissance.	In	1645,	Blaise	Pascal	
and	Pierre	de	Fermat	discovered	the	theory	of	probability,	which	is	the	core	of	the	concept	
of	risk,	when	solving	a	gambling	problem	(Bernstein,	1996).	Etymologically,	risk	stems	
from	the	early	Italian	word	risicare,	meaning	to	dare.	When	viewing	risk	from	that	latter	
perspective	there	is	a	choice	involved,	as	opposed	to	dependence	on	faith	which	was	the	
prevailing	view	of	life	in	the	past	(Bernstein,	1996).		
	
Today	many	definitions	exist	(e.g.	Aven	et	al.,	2015)	although	a	general	view	of	risk	is	that	
it	 is	 the	 chance	 of	 an	 adverse	 event	 occurring	 within	 a	 specific	 time‐frame	 and	 with	
specific	consequences	(Burgman,	2005).	Another	definition	is	that	risk	is	a	combination	
of	the	severity	and	probability	of	effects	from	a	certain	action,	where	severity	is	the	nature	
and	magnitude	of	the	effects	(Suter,	2007).	A	common	definition	that	can,	however,	be	
deceptive	to	some	extent	 is	 that	of	risk	expressed	as	an	expected	consequence,	 i.e.	 the	
probability	of	an	event	multiplied	by	its	consequence.	With	this	definition	an	event	with	
low	probability	and	high	consequence	would	not	be	separable	from	an	event	with	high	
probability	and	low	consequence	(Kaplan	and	Garrick,	1981).		
	
Aven	 (2010)	 argues	 that	 uncertainty	 should	 be	 included	 in	 the	 definition	 of	 risk	 and	
suggests	that	probability	is	only	a	tool	to	express	or	represent	uncertainty	and	that	risk	is	
not	limited	to	an	initiating	event,	its	consequences	and	the	associated	probabilities.	 Aven	
(2010)	 further	 discusses	 that	 probabilities	 assigned	 are	 based	 on	 background	
information	 and	 assumptions	 that	 could	 hide	 uncertainties	 and	 prevent	 them	 from	
receiving	proper	attention.	Aven	and	Renn	(2009)	define	risk	as	the	“uncertainty	about	
and	severity	of	the	consequences	(or	outcomes)	of	an	activity	with	respect	to	something	
that	humans	value”.	ISO	(2009)	also	includes	uncertainty	and	defines	risk	as	the	“effect	of	
uncertainty	on	objectives”.	Kaplan	and	Garrick	(1981)	prefer	to	state	that	a	quantitative	
risk	analysis	should	specifically	answer	the	following	three	questions:	
	
‐ What	can	happen?	
‐ How	likely	is	it?	
‐ What	are	the	consequences?	
	
The	risk	approach	chosen	should	be	appropriate	for	the	application	at	hand.	In	this	thesis	
the	approach	by	Kaplan	and	Garrick	(1981)	is	applied,	taking	uncertainties	into	account	
when	answering	 the	 last	 two	questions	above.	This	 is	described	by	 IEC	(1995)	as	 “the	
H.	Landquist	 	
	 	 	
8	
 
combination	 of	 the	 frequency,	 or	 probability,	 of	 occurrence	 and	 the	 consequence	 of	 a	
specified	 hazardous	 event”.	 However,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 this	 thesis	 examines	
combinations	of	several	hazardous	events.	Further	discussion	regarding	the	definitions	of	
risk	applied	in	this	thesis	is	presented	in	Chapter	7.	
	
There	is	an	ambiguity	surrounding	risk,	and	the	terminology	differs	greatly	(Aven,	2012).	
Some	of	the	commonly	used	definitions	are	shown	in	Table	1	and	define	the	meaning	of	
the	different	terms	as	used	in	this	thesis.	A	number	of	examples	for	a	shipwreck	context	
are	also	given.	
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Table	1.	Definitions	of	terms	based	on	(Aven,	2012),	 ISO	31000	(2009)	and	 IEC	(1995)	with	some	examples	coupled	to	
shipwreck	risk	assessment.	
	
	
Aleatory	uncertainty	 The	variation	of	quantities	in	a	population.	
E.g.	Oxygen	levels	of	the	water	around	a	shipwreck.	
Consequence	 The	outcome	of	an	event	affecting	objectives.	
E.g.	Effects	oil	discharge	in	the	marine	environment.	
Epistemic	uncertainty	 A	lack	of	knowledge	about	an	unknown	quantity.	
E.g.	Amount	of	oil	contained	in	a	shipwreck.	
Event	 The	occurrence	of	a	particular	set	of	circumstances.	
E.g.	Opening	in	a	shipwreck	though	which	oil	can	be	discharged.	
Hazardous	event	 An	event	that	can	cause	harm.	
E.g.	Construction	work,	Trawling	or	Shipping	traffic	possibly	causing	
damage	to	a	shipwreck.	
Hazardous	substance	 A	substance	with	the	potential	to	cause	harm.	
E.g.	Bunker	oil.	
Likelihood	 The	chance	of	something	happening.	
Risk	 A	combination	of	the	frequency,	or	probability,	of	occurrence	and	the	
consequence	of	a	specified	hazardous	event.	
Risk	analysis	 A	process	employed	to	comprehend	the	nature	of	risk	and	to	determine	
the	level	of	risk.	
Risk	assessment	 The	overall	process	of	risk	identification,	risk	analysis	and	risk	
evaluation.	
Risk	criteria	 The	terms	of	reference	against	which	the	significance	of	the	risk	is	
assessed.	
Risk	evaluation	 The	process	of	comparing	the	results	of	risk	analysis	with	risk	criteria	to	
determine	whether	the	risk	and/or	its	magnitude	is	acceptable	or	
tolerable.	
Risk	identification	 The	process	of	finding,	recognising	and	describing	risks.	
Risk	management	 The	coordination	of	activities	to	direct	and	control	an	organisation	with	
regard	to	risk.	Includes	risk	assessment	and	risk	reduction	and	control.		
Risk	management	
framework	
A	set	of	components	that	provide	the	foundations	and	organisational	
arrangements	for	designing,	implementing,	monitoring,	reviewing	and	
continually	improving	risk	management	throughout	the	organisation.	
Stakeholder	 A	person	or	organisation	that	can	be	affected	by,	or	perceive	themselves	
to	be	affected	by,	a	decision	or	activity.		
	
E.g.	the	Swedish	Maritime	Administration,	the	Swedish	Agency	for	Marine	
and	Water	Management,	the	Swedish	Coast	Guard,	the	Swedish	
Meteorological	and	Hydrological	Institute.	The	Swedish	Geological	Survey,	
Maritime	National	Museums	and	the	Swedish	Defence	Research	Agency.	
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2.1. Risk	and	shipwrecks		
The	 large	number	of	wrecks,	 the	associated	potential	remediation	costs,	and	the	many	
factors	affecting	the	consequences	of	a	discharge	from	wrecks	justify	a	risk	assessment	
approach	 (Michel	 et	 al.,	 2005;	 Etkin	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 There	 are	 also	major	 uncertainties	
associated	with	assessing	the	risk	of	hazardous	discharges	from	wrecks,	mainly	because	
there	 are	 few	measurements	 of	 how	different	 activities,	 such	 as	 construction	work	 or	
trawling,	affect	wrecks	(Michel	et	al.,	2005).	The	lack	of	measurements	and	available	data	
implies	 that	 assessments	 including	 expert	 judgements	 are	 necessary	 and	 that	 their	
estimations	are	also	uncertain.	Moreover,	site‐specific	conditions	make	generalisations	
concerning	the	effects	of	hazardous	discharge	difficult.	This	means	that	the	handling	of	
uncertainties	is	crucial	in	order	to	obtain	useful	results	from	a	risk	assessment	of	wrecks.	
	
2.1.1. Hazardous	activities	
As	 mentioned	 in	 the	 introductory	 chapter,	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	 factors	 that	 cause	
shipwrecks	 to	 deteriorate	 and	 ultimately	 this	 can	 lead	 to	 a	 discharge	 of	 hazardous	
substances	such	as	oil.	An	obvious	prerequisite	is	that	the	wreck	still	contains	hazardous	
cargo	 or	 bunker	 fuel	 for	 propulsion.	 A	 number	 of	 hazardous	 activities	 that	 carry	 the	
possibility	 of	 inducing	 discharge	 of	 oil	 from	 wrecks	 have	 been	 identified	 through	
literature	 reviews	 (Louzis	 et	 al.,	 2009;	 Michel	 et	 al.,	 2005;	 Etkin	 et	 al.,	 2009)	 and	
brainstorming	events	with	groups	of	experts	 in	which	Swedish	waters	are	used	as	 the	
focal	area.	Some	activities	are	induced	by	humans	whilst	other	activities	have	natural	or	
environmental	causes.	Below	 is	a	description	of	each	of	 the	eight	 identified	hazardous	
activities	 presented	 to	 experts	 when	 eliciting	 information	 for	 VRAKA.	 The	 elicitation	
procedure	is	presented	in	Paper	III.	
	
Construction	work	
Construction	work	 can	 vary	 in	 extent	 and	 can	 include	 preliminary	 investigations	 and	
work	ranging	from	aqua	culture	to	pipelines,	dredging,	port	construction	and	multi‐use	
platforms.	
	
Deterioration		
Deterioration	includes	the	wreck’s	general	condition	and	how	it	is	affected	by	corrosion	
and	other	types	of	degradation	since	the	time	the	vessel	sank.	
	
Diving	
Diving	 is	described	as	one	or	more	divers	approaching	a	wreck	 they	know	of	by	boat.	
Divers	 anchor	 and	 dive	 around	 or	 inside	 the	 wreck.	 Material	 from	 the	 wreck	 can	 be	
brought	to	the	surface.		
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Military	activity	
This	includes	activities	such	as	basic	seamanship	exercises	as	towing,	to	mine	sweeping	
and	use	of	military	force.	
	
Shipping	traffic	
Shipping	traffic	involves	everything	from	pleasure	boats,	ferry	traffic,	coast	guard	vessels	
and	ice	breakers	to	cruise	ships,	bulk	carriers	and	container	ships.		
	
Storms/Extreme	weather	
This	is	defined	as	winds	of	at	least	98‐102	km/h	(Storm).	
	
Trawling	
Trawling	means	fishing	with	everything	from	small	trawls	made	of	steel‐reinforced	wood	
close	to	the	coast	and	in	more	shallow	waters,	to	fishing	with	large	steel	trawls	further	
out	from	the	coast	at	considerable	depth.	
	
Unstable	seabed	
A	varying	amount	of	material	on	the	seabed	is	moved	over	a	distance	that	can	also	vary.	
	
2.1.2. Site‐specific	and	wreck‐specific	indicators	
The	probability	and	extent	of	the	damage	the	specific	hazardous	activities	can	lead	to	are	
assumed	to	be	dependent	on	a	number	of	site‐specific	and	wreck‐specific	indicators.		
These	indicators	were	arrived	at	during	brainstorming	sessions	with	experts	and	
through	literature	reviews	(Louzis	et	al.,	2009;	Michel	et	al.,	2005;	Etkin	et	al.,	2009;	
Sender,	2011).	The	indicators	are	(Paper	III,	IV):	
	
 Average	bottom	water	oxygen	concentration	
 Average	bottom	water	salinity	
 Average	bottom	water	temperature	
 Average	bottom	water	current	speed	
 Average	hull	thickness	
 Seabed	character	
 Ship	use		
 Time	since	sinking	
 Water	depth	
 Wreck	position	on	seabed	
2.2. The	risk	management	process	
There	are	several	frameworks	that	describe	the	risk	management	process	(e.g.	IEC,	1995;	
ISO,	2009).	They	are	typically	generic	in	the	sense	that	they	are	not	limited	to	one	specific	
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field	 of	 application	 and	 they	 share	 certain	 basic	 steps	 (Figure	 2):	 risk	 assessment,	
consisting	of	risk	analysis	and	risk	evaluation,	and	risk	reduction	and	control	collectively	
complete	a	full	risk	management	process.	
	
 
Figure	2.	A	simplified	representation	of	the	risk	management	process,	based	on	IEC	(1995).	
	
An	 expanded	 framework	 is	 provided	 by	 ISO	 (2009)	 (Figure	 3)	 where	 a	 broader	
presentation	of	the	risk	management	process	is	given.	In	establishment	of	the	context,	the	
organisation	sets	the	scope	and	risk	criteria	for	the	process.	Within	risk	identification,	the	
aim	is	to	produce	a	comprehensive	list	of	what	might	affect	achieving	the	objectives.	Risk	
analysis	is	the	process	of	understanding	the	nature	and	determining	the	level	of	risk	and	
should	provide	input	for	the	risk	evaluation	step,	which	could	act	as	support	when	making	
decisions	related	to	the	handling	of	risks.	Risk	evaluation	involves	comparing	the	results	
of	the	risk	analysis	with	risk	criteria	and	evaluating	possible	actions.	This	shows	whether	
the	risks	found	are	acceptable	or	not.	During	the	final	step,	risk	treatment,	one	or	more	
actions	are	chosen	and	implemented	to	mitigate	the	risk.		
In	 order	 to	 enter	 into	 a	 dialogue	 with	 stakeholders	 and	 to	 ensure	 an	 exchange	 of	
information	with	relevant	parties,	communication	and	consultation	are	important	during	
all	 the	 risk	management	 phases.	Monitoring	 and	 review	 should	 also	 be	 part	 of	 a	 risk	
management	 process,	 including	 providing	 input	 to	 improve	 the	 process,	 detecting	
changes	 that	should	be	reflected	 in	earlier	stages,	and	 identifying	emerging	risks	 (ISO,	
2009).	
Risk	management	can	be	a	help	to	decision‐makers	when	making	informed	actions	and	
when	 prioritising	 between	 options	 (ISO,	 2009).	 More	 specifically,	 it	 is	 through	 risk	
assessments	and	analyses	information	to	support	good	decisions	can	be	elicited	(Aven,	
2012).		
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Figure	3.	The	risk	management	process	after	ISO	(2009).	
2.3. Risk	assessment	
As	 noted	 above,	 the	 purpose	 of	 risk	 assessment	 is	 to	 provide	 input	 and	 support	 to	 a	
decision‐making	 process	 (Burgman,	 2005).	 It	 is	 performed	 within	 many	 disciplines	
including	medicine,	engineering	and	environmental	regulation	(Suter,	2007).	The	main	
steps	 in	 risk	 assessment	 are	 risk	 identification,	 risk	 analysis	 and	 risk	 evaluation	 as	
described	above	(ISO,	2009).	
	
Numerous	 tools	 are	 available	 for	 hazard	 and	 consequence	 identification,	 such	 as	
checklists	and	brainstorming,	hazard	matrices,	hazard	and	operability	analysis	(HAZOP),	
failure	modes	and	effects	analysis	(FMEA)	and	hierarchical	holographic	modelling	(HHM).	
Several	 tools	 could	 be	 applied	 for	 the	 same	 hazard	 identification	 process	 in	 order	 to	
increase	the	potential	to	detect	as	many	hazards	as	possible	(Burgman,	2005),	which	is	
also	the	purpose	of	this	step	(ISO,	2009).		
	
Risk	analysis	is	performed	to	develop	an	understanding	of	the	risk.	The	consequences	and	
their	 likelihoods	 are	 determined.	 The	 analysis	 can	 be	 qualitative,	 semi‐qualitative	 or	
quantitative	and	should	include	a	sensitivity	analysis.	The	type	of	analysis	depends	on	the	
level	of	detail	sought	and	other	circumstances,	such	as	the	purpose	of	the	risk	assessment	
(ISO,	2009).		
	
In	the	risk	evaluation,	identified	levels	of	risk	can	be	compared	to	pre‐set	criteria	for	risk	
acceptance	in	order	to	analyse	whether	the	risk	is	acceptable.	One	means	of	evaluating	
risk	against	set	criteria	in	practical	terms	is	the	use	of	the	ALARP	principle,	i.e.	“as	low	as	
reasonably	practicable”,	where	it	is	acknowledged	that	even	if	in	most	circumstances	risk	
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can	be	mitigated,	the	efforts	involved	to	mitigate	the	risk	to	that	extent	are	increasingly	
costly.	(Jones‐Lee	and	Aven,	2011;	Burgman,	2005)	(Figure	4).		
	
There	is	a	number	of	decision	criteria	available	for	stating	the	accepted	risk.	Preventing	
adverse	 effects,	 mitigating	 risk,	 and	 balancing	 costs	 and	 benefits,	 are	 some	 examples	
(Suter,	2007).	Criteria	of	this	nature	can	be	termed	utility‐based	and	rights‐based	criteria	
where	the	former	are	based	on	a	valuation	of	outcomes	while	the	latter	are	focused	on	
process	 and	 permitted	 action.	 An	 example	 of	 a	 utility‐based	 criterion	 is	 benefit‐cost	
(probabilistic	or	deterministic)	which	is	aiming	at	identifying	the	alternative	that	produces	
the	highest	net	benefit.	Rights‐based	criteria	are	instead	expressed	as	e.g.	zero	risk,	where	
risk	is	eliminated	independently	of	benefits	and	costs.	Another	example	of	a	rights‐based	
criterion	is	bounded	or	constrained	risk,	where	the	level	of	risk	is	constrained	to	a	specific	
level	or	meets	a	specific	criterion.	Combinations	of	these	types	of	criteria	are	also	possible	
(Morgan	and	Henrion,	1990).		
	
A	range	of	methods	are	available	to	support	the	decision‐making	process	and	to	evaluate	
if	the	set	criteria	have	been	met.	Risk	ranking	is	a	simple	form	of	risk	comparison	where	
risks	 are	 ordered.	 Risk	 classification	 involves	 assigning	 risks	 as	 e.g.	 acceptable	 or	
unacceptable	 (Suter,	 2007),	 see	 also	 ALARP	 above.	 Examples	 of	 more	 elaborate	
techniques	are	Multi	Criteria	Decision	Analysis	(MCDA)	and	Cost‐Benefit	Analysis	(CBA),	
where	MCDA	is	a	means	of	guiding	the	decision‐maker	by	defining	the	all	relevant	criteria	
for	evaluating	the	risk	(Burgman,	2005).	Cost‐Benefit	Analysis	is	an	example	of	a	method	
with	an	economic	focus,	measuring	whether	the	benefits	are	greater	than	the	costs	for	a	
particular	action	from	a	societal	point	of	view	(Hanley	and	Barbier,	2009).	Furthermore,	
Cost‐Effectiveness	Analysis	(CEA)	is	a	means	of	finding	the	outcome	with	the	least	cost	in	
relation	to	other	outcomes	rather	than	in	absolute	numbers	(Munier,	2004).	
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Figure	4.	The	ALARP‐principle	based	on	Burgman	(2005).	
 
2.4. Decision‐making		
A	basic	structure	for	the	decision‐making	process	is	shown	in	Figure	5	(Aven,	2012).	The	
structure	is	founded	on	the	assumption	that	decision‐making	is	a	process	where	risk	and	
decision	analyses,	e.g.	CBA	or	MCDA,	provide	input.	Informal	managerial	judgement	and	
review	 should	 follow,	 to	 result	 in	 a	 decision.	 The	 risk	 management	 process	 and	 the	
decision‐making	structure	do	not	conflict;	rather,	the	former	is	an	important	component	
of	the	latter.		
 
Figure	5.	Basic	structure	of	the	decision‐making	process	(Aven,	2012).	
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2.5. Uncertainty	and	probability	
Two	common	denominators	for	problems	concerning	risk	are	that	a	decision	needs	to	be	
made	 and	 that	 uncertainties	 are	 involved	 (Suter,	 2007).	 Uncertainty	 is	 a	 far‐reaching	
concept	 and	 can	 emerge	 from	 statistical	 variation,	 linguistic	 indistinctness,	 variability,	
inherent	 randomness,	 and	 so	 on	 (Morgan	 and	 Henrion,	 1990).	 Potential	 sources	 of	
uncertainty	are	many,	although	uncertainty	is	in	general	categorised	as	one	of	two	types:	
epistemic	and	aleatory.	 	Epistemic	uncertainty	is	assumed	to	be	derived	from	a	lack	of	
data	and	aleatory	(stochastic)	uncertainty	refers	to	intrinsic	randomness	and	describes	
natural	variability	in	populations	(Kiureghian	and	Ditlevsen,	2009;	Aven,	2012).	However,	
purely	aleatory	uncertainties	seem	rare	since	they	often	have	an	epistemic	component	
(O'Hagan	 and	 Oakley,	 2004).	 Uncertainty	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 “Imperfect	 or	 incomplete	
information/knowledge	about	a	hypothesis,	a	quantity,	or	the	occurrence	of	an	event”	(Aven	
et	al.,	2015).		
The	quality	of	the	risk	assessment	will	largely	depend	on	how	uncertainties	are	dealt	with.	
Uncertainties	must	be	treated	in	a	comprehensive,	repeatable	and	transparent	manner	
(Burgman,	2005).	The	aleatory	type	of	uncertainty	is	determined	by	the	circumstances	
and	cannot	be	reduced,	only	acknowledged.	However,	the	epistemic	uncertainties	can	be	
reduced	through	increased	information.	There	are	several	techniques	for	evaluating	and	
handling	 uncertainties	 in	 risk	 analysis.	 One	 approach,	 applied	 in	 this	 thesis,	 is	
probabilistic	risk	analysis,	also	known	as	quantitative	risk	analysis,	which	can	be	used	to	
estimate	 or	 cope	 with	 uncertainties	 regarding	 our	 knowledge	 about	 probability	 and	
associated	consequences	(e.g.	Bedford	and	Cooke,	2001).		
An	 important	 means	 of	 evaluating	 and	 handling	 uncertainty	 is	 to	 apply	 a	 Bayesian	
approach,	facilitating	a	formal	handling	of	subjective	information.	Around	one	hundred	
years	after	the	theory	of	probability	was	formulated	by	Fermat	and	Pascal,	as	mentioned	
in	the	beginning	of	the	chapter,	Thomas	Bayes	discovered	how	new	information	could	be	
mathematically	 combined	with	old	 information	 to	provide	better	decisions	 (Bernstein,	
1996).	Bayesian	probability	is	a	belief‐type	approach	an	assessor	can	apply	to	rationally	
change	 a	 belief	 when	 new	 evidence	 is	 found	 (Hacking,	 2001).	 When	 applying	 Bayes’	
theory,	 a	 prior	 distribution	 can	 be	 updated	 to	 a	 posterior	 distribution.	 The	 prior	
distribution	is	based	on	knowledge,	including	measurement	data,	and	expertise,	while	the	
posterior	 distribution	 also	 acknowledges	 additional	 information,	 e.g.	 from	 a	 newly	
performed	 sampling	 campaign.	 The	 extensive	 use	 of	 the	 Bayesian	 approach	 can	 be	
attributed	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 combining	 expert	 judgements	 with	 scientific	 evidence	
(Bedford	and	Cooke,	2001).		
Furthermore,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	 accept	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	 uncertainty	 in	 unknown	
unknowns,	i.e.	aspects	that	were	not	possible	to	know	beforehand.	It	is	simply	impossible	
to	include	all	relationships	and	variables	(Metz	et	al.,	2007).	
	
Probability	can	be	interpreted	and	expressed	in	different	ways	as	either	frequentist	or	
subjectivist.	A	frequentist	approach	“defines	the	probability	of	an	event´s	occurring	in	a	
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particular	trial	as	the	frequency	with	which	it	occurs	in	a	long	sequence	of	similar	trials”	
(Morgan	 and	 Henrion,	 1990,	 48).	 The	 subjectivist,	 or	 Bayesian,	 definition	 views	 the	
probability	of	an	event	rather	as	“the	degree	of	belief	that	a	person	has	that	it	will	occur,	
given	all	the	relevant	information	currently	known	to	that	person”	(Morgan	and	Henrion,	
1990,	49).	Although	subjective,	a	Bayesian	probability	must,	to	be	legitimate,	follow	the	
axioms	 of	 probability.	 For	 example,	 if	 a	 probability	 of	 an	 event	 occurring	 is	 pi,	 the	
complement,	 i.e.	 the	 event	 not	 occurring,	 is	 1‐pi	 (Morgan	 and	 Henrion,	 1990).	 In	 this	
thesis,	the	Bayesian	or	subjectivist	approach	is	applied	since	there	is	a	lack	of	background	
information	and	observational	data	that	could	serve	as	 input	 for	 the	model.	Moreover,	
every	shipwreck	is	unique	and	an	event	in	the	form	of	a	more	extensive	discharge	is	not	
repeatable.	
	
A	main	 focus	of	 this	 thesis	was	 to	develop	 a	method	 for	 calculating	 the	probability	 of	
discharge	 of	 oil	 from	 shipwrecks.	 A	 Bayesian	 approach	 was	 applied	 to	 estimate	
probabilities	 as	 degrees	 of	 belief.	 An	 assessment	 of	 site‐specific	 and	 wreck‐specific	
parameters	was	applied	to	update	earlier	estimations	of	the	probability	of	opening	in	a	
wreck.	Since	the	background	information	and	knowledge	for	the	probability	estimation	is	
incomplete,	 the	probability	 estimation	 itself	 is	uncertain.	 Statistical	distributions	were	
thus	assigned	to	represent	the	uncertainty	of	the	probability	estimations.	The	approach	
taken	here	is	in	accordance	with	the	approach	to	probabilistic	risk	analysis	described	by,	
for	example,	Bedford	and	Cooke	(2001).	 	
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3. 	Risk	assessment	approaches	for	shipwrecks	
In	 Paper	 I,	 Evaluating	 the	 needs	 of	 risk	 assessment	 methods	 of	 potentially	 polluting	
shipwrecks,	 six	 methods	 and	 approaches	 for	 risk	 assessment	 of	 shipwrecks	 were	
analysed	in	order	to	evaluate	if	they	could	provide	relevant	decision	support	in	this	area.	
The	identified	methods	were	compared	to,	in	the	case	for	shipwrecks,	relevant	parts	of	
the	 ISO	 standard	 for	 risk	 assessment,	 ISO	 31000,	 Risk	 management	 –	 Principles	 and	
guidelines	(ISO,	2009),	see	Section	2.1	for	further	details	of	the	standard.	More	explicitly,	
parts	 assumed	 to	 be	 relevant	 correspond	 to	 the	 necessary	 steps	 for	 a	 comprehensive	
environmental	 risk	 assessment	 of	 shipwrecks	 and	 are	 presented	 in	 Table	 2.	 Since	
publication,	three	further	works	present	approaches	for	risk	assessment	of	shipwrecks,	
NOAA	(2013),	Ventikos	et	al.	(2013)	and	Ventikos	et	al.	(2016).	Some	of	the	authors	of	the	
first	publication	authored	the	publication	of	the	WORP	project	(NOAA,	2009)	presented	
below	as	approach	A.	The	latter	publications	share	authors	with	the	publication	by	Louzis	
et	al.	(2009),	presented	below	as	method	F,	but	there	is	no	clear	reference	between	the	
earlier	and	latter	works.	These	more	recent	methods	are	added	to	the	original	comparison	
and	a	summary	is	presented	in	Table	2.	The	full	comparison	is	appended	to	Paper	I	as	
supplementary	information.		
3.1. Identified	methods	and	approaches	for	environmental	risk	
assessment	of	shipwrecks	
The	 methods	 and	 approaches	 for	 risk	 assessment	 of	 wrecks	 were	 found	 in	 scientific	
papers	 and	 other	 official	 reports.	 Other	 material,	 such	 as	 the	 Nairobi	 International	
Convention	on	the	Removal	of	Wrecks	(International	Maritime	Organization,	2007),	was	
not	included	since	it	was	not	intended	as	a	framework	for	risk	assessment	of	shipwrecks.	
Furthermore,	 the	 IMO	 Guidelines	 for	 Formal	 Safety	 Assessment	 (FSA)	 (International	
Maritime	Organisation,	2002)	is	excluded	since	it	is	not	a	wreck‐specific	guideline.		
The	evaluated	methods	and	approaches	were:		
A. The	Wreck	 Oil	 Removal	 Program	 (WORP),	 aimed	 to	 use	 a	 scientifically‐based	
approach	to	remove	oil	and	focused	specifically	on	trying	to	minimise	costs	and	
the	risk	of	pollution	from	sunken	commercial	vessels	(NOAA,	2009).	
	
B. Michel	 et	 al.	 (2005)	 presented	 an	 oil	 release	 risk	 assessment	 guide	 for	
shipwrecks.	 The	 goal	 was	 stated	 as	 being	 to	 objectively	 analyse	 shipwrecks	
according	 to	 their	 potential	 threat	 of	 petroleum	 discharge	 and	 to	 provide	
guidance	on	addressing	this	issue.		
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	 Etkin	et	al.	(2009)	presented	a	similar	guide,	although	taking	into	account	both	
the	probability	of	leakage	and	the	impact	of	such	a	leakage	occurring,	in	order	to	
assess	 the	 environmental	 risk	 of	 shipwrecks.	 It	 was	 a	 strategic	 modelling	
approach	to	prioritise	shipwrecks	and	the	aim	was	to	provide	decision	support	
for	authorities.		
	
C. DEvelopment	 of	 European	 Guidelines	 for	 Potentially	 Polluting	 Shipwrecks	
(DEEPP)	aimed	to	provide	European	coastal	states	and	national	administrations	
with	guidelines	and	criteria	 to	handle	 the	environmental	 threat	of	 shipwrecks	
(Alcaro	et	al.,	2007).		
	
D. The	Norwegian	Pollution	Control	Agency	(NPCA)	described	a	wreck	project	 in	
three	phases:	registration,	priority	ranking	and	required	action.	The	aim	was	to	
have	 a	 complete	 overview	 of	 shipwrecks	 along	 the	 Norwegian	 coast	 (Idaas,	
2005).	
	
E. The	 Pacific	 Ocean	 Pollution	 Programme	 (PACPOL)	 within	 the	 South	 Pacific	
Regional	Environment	Programme	(SPREP)	was	aimed	at	pollution	of	the	marine	
environment	 from	ship‐based	sources.	This	 specific	 strategy	was	aimed	at	e.g.	
preventing	or	mitigating	the	negative	impact	of	shipwrecks	(SPREP	and	SOPAC,	
2002).			
	
F. A	risk	analysis	strategy	for	shipwrecks	in	Greek	waters	was	presented	by	Louzis	
et	al.	(2009).	It	was	aimed	at	oil	leakage	and	was	based	on	the	IMO	Formal	Safety	
Assessment	(2002).	
	
G. NOAA	 (2013)	 presented	 a	 comprehensive	 method	 for	 risk	 assessment	 of	
potentially	polluting	wrecks	in	U.S.	waters.	Pollution	potential	was	estimated	as	
well	as	the	consequences	of	a	range	of	spills.	Possible	response	alternatives	were	
also	explored.	
	
H. Ventikos	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 presented	 the	 development	 of	 an	 application	 for	 risk	
analysis	of	shipwrecks	in	Greek	waters.	A	database	was	developed,	an	approach	
for	 risk	 assessment	 was	 presented	 and	 finally	 GIS	 tools	 were	 used	 in	 the	
visualisation	of	data	and	results.	
	
I. In	“Enhanced	decision	making	through	probabilistic	risk	assessment:	Focusing	
on	 the	 situation	 in	 Greece”,	 Ventikos	 et	 al.	 (2016)	 presented	 a	 method	 for	
estimating	 the	 probability	 of	 release	 using	 dynamic	 fault	 tree	 modelling.	
Consequences	 were	 estimated	 qualitatively	 and	 then	 combined	 with	 the	
probability	using	a	risk	matrix.	
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3.2. Comparison	with	an	international	standard	for	risk	management	
Each	of	the	methods	found	were	graded	on	a	four‐point	scale	with	respect	to	each	of	the	
selected	parameters	 from	the	 ISO	standard.	The	parameters	were	evaluated	 from	“not	
considered	at	all”,	“considered”,	“fulfilled	to	some	extent”,	to	“fulfilled	to	a	large	extent”.	A	
summary	is	presented	in	Table	2.	
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Table	2.	The	results	of	the	comparison	of	risk	assessment	methods	for	shipwrecks.	A	=	The	Wreck	Oil	Removal	Programme	
(NOAA,	2009),	B	=	Potentially	polluting	wrecks	in	marine	waters	(Michel	et	al.,	2005),	C	=	The	DEEPP	project,	
Development	of	European	guidelines	for	Potentially	Polluting	shipwrecks	(Alcaro	et	al.,	2007),	D	=	The	Norwegian	
Pollution	Control	Authority	(Idaas,	2005),	E	=	The	South	Pacific	Regional	Environment	Programme	(SPREP	and	SOPAC,	
2002),	F	=	Louzis	et	al.	(2009),	G	=	The	method	by	NOAA	(2013),	H	=	The	approach	by	Ventikos	et	al.	(2013)	and	I	=	
Ventikos	et	al.	(2016).	
	
	
The	 comparison	 in	Paper	 I	 showed	 that	 there	was	no	 comprehensive	method	 for	 risk	
assessment	of	shipwrecks.	The	main	weaknesses	found	were	that	many	of	the	methods	
were	qualitative	and	in	general	did	not	include	sensitivity	or	uncertainty	analysis.	Overall,	
risk	evaluation	did	not	correspond	to	the	level	“fulfilled	to	a	large	extent”.	The	methods	
found	 provide	 some	 guidance	 but	 none	 provide	 comprehensive	 support	 for	 decision‐
making	 with	 regard	 to	 shipwrecks.	 To	 some	 extent,	 the	 new	 methods	 comprised	
uncertainty	 analysis	 and	 NOAA	 (2013)	 also	 incorporate	 a	 quantitative	 probabilistic	
method	for	consequence	assessment,	although	not	regarding	the	probability	of	discharge.	
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Ventikos	et	al.	(2013)	and	Ventikos	et	al.	(2016)	provide	partly	qualitative	estimations	
and	 Ventikos	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 includes	 uncertainty	 analysis	 while	 Ventikos	 et	 al.	 (2016)	
includes	both	sensitivity	analysis	and	addresses	the	issue	of	uncertainty.	It	should	also	be	
pointed	out	that	some	of	the	approaches	compared	are	at	the	preparatory	stage	while	e.g.	
NOAA	 (2013)	 and	 Idaas	 (2005)	 are	 actually	 applied	 to	 a	 larger	 number	 of	wrecks.	 In	
summary,	NOAA	(2013)	and	Ventikos	et	al.	(2016)	are	the	most	developed	approaches	
according	to	the	comparison	presented	in	Table	2	but	there	is	still	no	fully	probabilistic	
comprehensive	risk	assessment	method	for	shipwrecks	that	provides	decision	support	in	
relation	 to	 this	 threat.	 Lack	 of	 holistic	 risk	 assessment	 and	 decision	 support	 for	
shipwrecks	could	potentially	lead	to	inefficient	allocation	of	resources	for	risk	mitigation.	
The	comparison	presented	here	and	in	Paper	I	forms	the	basis	for	the	development	of	the	
framework	and	model	for	probabilistic	risk	assessment	of	shipwrecks	presented	in	this	
thesis.	The	framework	clearly	states	the	parts	that	should	be	included	and	stresses	the	
link	 between	 risk	 management	 and	 decision‐making.	 The	 suggested	 framework	 is	
presented	 in	 more	 detail	 in	 in	 Chapter	 4	 and	 in	 Chapter	 6	 the	 developed	 model	 is	
described.	
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4. 	A	risk	management	framework	for	
potentially	polluting	shipwrecks	
Environmental	 risk	 management	 of	 shipwrecks	 is	 complex	 and	 should	 therefore	 be	
performed	in	a	structured	way.	A	generic	framework	for	risk	management	of	shipwrecks	
was	suggested	in	Paper	I	(Figure	6Figure 1),	based	on	ISO	(2009),	which	is	an	international	
standard.	 The	 purpose	 was	 to	 emphasise	 the	 link	 between	 decision‐making	 and	 risk	
management	and	stress	 that	risk	assessment	 is	an	essential	basis	 for	decision‐making.	
Certain	additional	parts	were	added	to	the	original	guidelines	to	stress,	for	example,	the	
communication	of	results	to	stakeholders	and	the	need	to	handle	uncertainties.	
	
Exchange	of	information	and	communication	are	important	in	this	type	of	procedure	since	
it	is	essential	that	those	responsible	for	implementing	the	results	are	well	informed	about	
the	basis	for	possible	decisions.	Risk	management	is	an	iterative	process	and	stakeholders	
should	 be	 continuously	 involved	 in	 the	 different	 steps.	 A	 review	 should	 be	 made	 to	
incorporate	new	information	and	update	parts	of	the	risk	management	work	during	the	
process	 if	 necessary	 (ISO,	 2009).	 Furthermore,	 the	 complexity	 implies	 that	 a	 team	 of	
experts	should	be	 involved	to	ensure	 that	knowledge	of	marine	activities,	 the	physical	
properties	of	a	ship,	the	risk	assessment	process	and	other	factors	are	duly	considered.	
	
The	 framework	 presents	 a	 holistic	 risk	 management	 structure	 for	 shipwrecks	 and	 is	
based	on	well‐established	views	of	risk	management.	Only	by	applying	a	comprehensive	
framework	 and	 adopting	 a	 holistic	 view	 of	 the	 problem	 can	 a	 full	 risk	 management	
process	 and	 assessment	 be	 made.	 When	 a	 framework	 is	 in	 place,	 methods	 can	 be	
developed	that	are	well	suited	to	the	purpose	of	each	specific	part	and	to	the	process	as	a	
whole.		
	
The	 framework	advocates	proactive	 risk	management	 to	mitigate	 the	 risk	of	pollution	
from	 shipwrecks.	 However,	 risk	 assessment	 cannot	 be	 the	 sole	 source	 of	 information	
input	 behind	 a	 decision,	 aspects	 not	 included	 in	 the	 risk	 assessment	 should	 also	 be	
considered	in	the	decision‐making	process	(Aven,	2003).		
	
In	order	to	implement	the	framework	in	practice,	it	is	necessary	to	use	an	adequate	set	of	
methods	and	tools.	Largely	generalised	assessments	are	due	to	the	complex	cause‐and‐
effect	chains	of	risks	involved	with	shipwrecks,	not	likely	to	provide	useful	results	and	
tools	should	therefore	be	chosen	with	care.	Furthermore,	uncertainties	are	assumed	to	be	
considerable	 and	 should	be	handled	properly	by	adopting	a	quantitative,	 probabilistic	
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approach.	Development	of	methods	and	tools	for	making	a	risk	assessment	of	shipwrecks	
is	initiated	and	presented	in	Chapter	6	and	in	Papers	I‐V	in	this	thesis.	
	
	
Figure	6.	Generic	framework	for	risk	management	and	assessment	of	potentially	polluting	shipwrecks	(Paper	I).	
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5. 	Methods	
This	chapter	describes	the	methods	applied	in	the	appended	papers	(Figure	7).	The	fault	
tree	approach	is	used	largely	in	Papers	II	and	IV,	and	likewise	Monte	Carlo	analysis,	as	
means	 for	 estimating	 the	 probability	 of	 discharge	 of	 hazardous	 substances.	 Expert	
elicitation	and	the	SHELF	package	(Sheffield	Elicitation	Framework)	are	applied	in	Paper	
III	for	obtaining	input	data	for	VRAKA.	The	Digital	Environmental	Atlas	and	the	oil	spill	
trajectory	 model	 Seatrack	 Web	 are	 used	 in	 Paper	 V.	 The	 theory	 for	 Paper	 I,	 risk	
assessment	and	management,	is	described	in	Chapter	2.		
	
	
 
Figure	7.	Overview	of	method	application	in	Papers	I‐V.	
5.1. Fault	tree	analysis	
Logic	trees,	such	as	fault	and	event	trees	linking	hazardous	events	and	processes,	have	a	
wide	range	of	applications	(Burgman,	2005).	An	event	tree	describes	subsequent	events	
following	a	starting	event	and	the	final	outcomes	for	different	scenarios	can	be	specified.	
Fault	 trees	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 seek	 to	 find	 the	 actions	 or	 events	 that	 cause	 such	 an	
initiating	event.	The	 fault	 tree	emerges	 from	basic	events	and	passes	via	 intermediate	
events	to	the	analysed	top	event	(Bedford	and	Cooke,	2001).	An	example	of	a	fault	tree	is	
shown	in	Figure	8.	
	
In	 a	 fault	 tree,	 several	 logic	 gates	 describe	 how	 the	 underlying	 events	 are	 connected	
(Bedford	and	Cooke,	2001;	Burgman,	2005;	Roberts	et	al.,	1981).	In	this	thesis,	the	AND	
and	OR	gates	are	applied.	The	AND	gate	defines	an	outcome	where	all	the	input	events	
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must	occur	simultaneously	while	the	OR	gate	describes	an	outcome	where	only	one	of	the	
input	events	must	occur	(Roberts	et	al.,	1981).	Mathematical	descriptions	of	the	two	gates	
applied	are	provided	in	Equations	1	and	2,	where	P	represents	probability	and	index	 i	
represents	an	event	in	the	fault	tree.	
	
	
 
Figure	8.	Example	of	a	fault	tree.	Simplified	description	of	a	potential	oil	discharge	from	a	ship	in	traffic.	
   
 
       
      Equation	1	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 Equation	2	
  
5.1. Monte	Carlo	simulation	
Monte	Carlo	simulation	is	a	technique	applied	in	uncertainty	analysis	(e.g.	Bedford	and	
Cooke,	 2001).	 It	 is	 based	 on	 random	 sampling	 and	 provides	 a	 means	 to	 cope	 with	
uncertainty	in	input	information	and	results	(Burgman,	2005).	In	VRAKA,	input	data	is	
provided	 as	 ranges	 or	 probability	 distributions.	 Through	Monte	 Carlo	 simulation,	 the	
outcome	estimate	sought	is	calculated	using	random	sampling	of	the	input	distributions	
for	a	set	number	of	iterations	(see	Figure	9	for	a	schematic	visualisation).	A	probability	
distribution	is	obtained	that	represents	the	whole	spectrum	of	possible	outcomes	rather	
than	 a	 point	 value.	 This	 technique	 facilitates	 sensitivity	 and	 uncertainty	 analysis	 (e.g.	
Bedford	and	Cooke,	2001;	Burgman,	2005).	
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Figure	9.	The	concept	of	Monte	Carlo	simulation	according	to	Lindhe	(2010).	Input	information	is	given	as	distributions,	
and	results	are	presented	including	uncertainties.	
	
5.2. Expert	elicitation	
Shipwreck	risk	assessment	is	associated	with	uncertainties.	Lack	of	measurable	data	or	
difficulty	obtaining	data	due	to	cost	or	other	conditions,	such	as	the	depth	of	the	wreck,	
complicate	 the	 risk	 assessment.	 One	 means	 of	 gathering	 or	 estimating	 this	 type	 of	
information	and	reducing	the	uncertainties	of	the	outcome	is	to	ask	for	an	expert	opinion	
and	subjective	probabilities	(Bedford	and	Cooke,	2001).			
	
5.2.1. Experts,	heuristics	and	biases		
Expert	 judgement	 is	 almost	 unavoidable	 in	 environmental	 risk	 assessment.	 When	
empirical	 evidence	 or	 extrapolations	 are	 not	 available,	 experts	 can	 step	 in.	 They	 can	
estimate	 intervals	 and	 make	 point	 estimates	 or	 statistical	 distributions	 by	 using	
frequency	 concepts	 of	 probability	 without	 any	 measurement	 information	 (Burgman,	
2005).		An	expert	could,	for	example,	be	someone	with	the	best	available	knowledge	about	
the	quantities	of	interest	(Garthwaite	et	al.,	2005),	or	a	person	with	a	great	deal	of	training	
and	knowledge	in	a	specific	field	who	provides	an	opinion	(Ayyub,	2001).		
	
People	make	judgements	under	uncertainty	based	on	a	number	of	heuristic	principles.		
These	are	strategies	or	instinctive	processes	that	reduce	a	complex	question	to	simpler	
judgements.	A	 couple	 of	heuristics	might	be	useful	but	 can	also	 lead	 to	 serious	 errors	
(Tversky	and	Kahneman,	1974).	Heuristics	mentioned	by	Tversky	and	Kahneman	(1974)	
include:	(1)	representativeness,	(2),	availability	and	(3)	adjustment	and	anchoring.		
	
Tversky	and	Kahneman	(1983)	describe	representativeness	as	estimated	correspondence	
between	a	sample	and	a	population	or	an	outcome	and	a	model.		Alternatively,	it	could	be	
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the	degree	 to	which	A	 is	 representative	of	B	or	 resembles	B	 (Tversky	and	Kahneman,	
1974).	Representativeness	is	specifically	relevant	when	eliciting	conditional	probabilities	
where	the	expert	might	assess	probability	by	how	well	outcome	A	represents	model	B	
rather	than	the	probability	of	obtaining	outcome	B	given	model	A	(O'Hagan	et	al.,	2006).		
The	 conjunction	 fallacy	 is	 one	 type	 of	 cognitive	 bias	 that	 can	 be	 attributed	 to	
representativeness.	The	probability	of	the	conjunction,	P(A&B)	cannot	be	larger	than	the	
constituting	probabilities	P(A)	and	P(B),	as	the	former	is	described	using	parts	of	these	
subsets	(or	the	whole	subsets	if	P(A)	and	P(B)	are	equal).	However,	the	conjunction	can	
be	more	representative	than	each	of	P(A)	or	P(B),	which	is	why	an	error	could	be	made.	
Another	 difficulty	 is	 to	 separate	 P(A|B)	 from	 P(B|A),	 known	 as	 the	 inverse	 fallacy	
(Villejoubert	and	Mandel,	2002).		
	
Availability	can	be	applied	when	assessing	a	frequency	or	probability.	Frequent	events	are	
more	easily	recalled	than	less	frequent	events	and	the	judgement	is	based	on	the	ease	the	
occurrence	can	be	brought	 to	mind	(Tversky	and	Kahneman,	1974).	The	easier	 it	 is	 to	
recall	an	event,	the	higher	the	assessment	of	probability.	An	event	with	low	frequency	but	
high	media	coverage	would	thus	also	be	assigned	a	high	probability	(O'Hagan	et	al.,	2006).	
If,	 however,	 the	 assessor	 or	 expert	 has	 great	personal	 experience	 of	 the	 problem	 that	
needs	to	be	assessed,	this	heuristic	might	perform	quite	well	(Morgan	and	Henrion,	1990).		
	
Anchoring	and	adjustment	refer	to	when	people	make	judgements	based	on	an	initial	value	
and	 then	 adjust	 that	 judgement	 to	 reach	 a	 final	 assessment	 (Tversky	 and	 Kahneman,	
1974).	However,	there	is	a	tendency	towards	not	adjusting	the	final	value	sufficiently	and	
the	estimate	is	biased	with	regard	to	the	initial	value.	The	anchoring	and	adjustment	effect	
can	apply	to	any	kind	of	quantitative	judgement	(O'Hagan	et	al.,	2006).		
	
Both	 experts	 and	 laymen	 provide	 assessments	 influenced	 by	 heuristics	 even	 if	 some	
elementary	errors	can	be	avoided	if	the	expert	is	trained	in	the	use	of	statistics.	Heuristics	
can	be	a	very	effective	means	of	making	decisions	although	understanding	the	heuristics	
can	lead	to	better	decisions	under	uncertain	conditions	(Tversky	and	Kahneman,	1974).	
The	process	needs	to	be	constructed	in	a	way	that	the	influence	of	heuristics	and	bias	in	
the	elicitation	are	minimised.	Anchoring	effects	could,	for	example,	be	handled	in	part	by	
carefully	 choosing	 the	 order	 of	 the	 questions	 posed	 to	 the	 expert.	 The	 process	 could	
encourage	analytical	thinking	by,	for	example,	applying	aids	and	the	experts’	experience	
should	be	considered	in	relation	to	possible	anchoring	and	availability	effects	(O'Hagan	et	
al.,	2006).	
	
5.2.2. Stakeholders	
Public	concern	and	awareness	of	the	many	aspects	of	risk	has	become	stronger	due	to	the	
growth	 in	 communications,	 availability	 of	 information	 and	 scientific	 advances	 (Aven,	
2012).	A	person	or	organisation	that	is	particularly	affected	by	the	consequences	of	an	
environmental	management	decision	is	called	a	stakeholder	(Suter,	2007).	There	are	also	
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definitions	 containing	 non‐human	 entities,	 such	 as	 endangered	 animals	 and	 plants	
(Burgman,	2005).	The	public	as	a	whole	can	have	an	interest	in	environmental	decisions	
and	 decisions	 not	 accepted	 by	 those	 affected	 would	 be	 politically	 unacceptable.	 The	
general	public	and	the	stakeholders	that	are	affected	specifically	by	the	decision	should	
be	separated	and	consequently	the	latter	group	is	smaller.	It	could	be	necessary	to	involve	
a	larger	group	from	the	general	public	in	addition	to	the	stakeholders	in	order	to	balance	
the	input	since	the	stakeholders	tend	to	be	biased	(Suter,	2007).		
When	using	stakeholders	as	a	source	of	information	and	input	for	decision‐making,	it	is	
important	that	their	knowledge	is	used	effectively.	This	involves,	for	example,	choosing	
the	 right	 stakeholders	 for	 the	 problem	 at	 hand,	 eliciting	 information	 rigorously	 and	
applying	 appropriate	 analysis	 techniques.	 There	 should	 be	 a	 clear	 statement	 and	
communication	of	the	purpose	of	the	assessment	to	the	stakeholders.	A	clear	and	honest	
communication	 process	 throughout	 the	 assessment	 is	 necessary	 for	 effective	 dialogue	
(Glicken,	2000).	
An	expert	could	be	a	stakeholder	and	vice	versa.	In	this	thesis	work,	numerous	experts	
have	been	involved	in	the	expert	elicitation	processes	and	a	large	number	of	stakeholders	
have	been	involved	e.g.	in	reference	groups.	However,	some	of	the	stakeholders	were	also	
brought	in	as	experts	and	vice	versa.	
	
5.2.3. Elicitation	methods	
Several	 approaches,	 general	 suggestions,	 methods	 and	 guidelines	 for	 eliciting	 expert	
opinion	and	subjective	probabilities	are	described	in	the	 literature	(Walls	and	Quigley,	
2001;	 Cooke,	 1991;	 Morgan	 and	 Henrion,	 1990;	 Meyer	 and	 Booker,	 2001;	 Jenkinson,	
2005;	 Phillips,	 1999;	 Cooke	 and	 Goossens,	 2000;	 Kuhnert	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 Ayyub,	 2001).	
However,	 consensus	 prevails	 regarding	 the	 broader	 concept	 and	 Jenkinson	 (2005)	
suggests	the	following	process:	
	
1. Background	and	preparation	
2. Identifying	and	recruiting	experts	
3. Motivating	the	experts	
4. Structuring	and	decomposition	
5. Probability	training	
6. Elicitation	
	
The	first	step	involves	identifying	the	variables	to	be	assessed.	Here	the	facilitator	also	
has	the	opportunity	to	acquire	knowledge	of	the	specific	field	in	order	to	communicate	
effectively	 with	 the	 experts.	 Preparation	 of	 the	 elicitation	 session	 and	 arranging	 the	
required	documents	are	also	part	of	the	first	step	(O'Hagan	et	al.,	2006).		
	
The	 second	 step,	 identifying	 and	 recruiting	 experts	 for	 elicitation,	 is	 a	 very	 important	
stage.	Certain	criteria	that	could	be	applied	when	selecting	experts	are	provided	by	Hora	
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and	 Von	 Winterfeldt	 (1997):	 tangible	 evidence	 of	 expertise,	 reputation,	 willingness	 to	
participate	and	availability,	understanding	of	the	general	problem	area,	lack	of	an	economic	
or	personal	stake	in	the	potential	findings	and	impartiality.	O'Hagan	et	al.	(2006)	also	point	
out	 that	 it	 might	 be	 worth	 the	 effort	 to	 investigate	 the	 expert’s	 level	 of	 statistical	
understanding.	If	this	knowledge	is	poor,	training	could	be	provided	at	a	later	stage.	
	
The	third	step	involves	motivating	the	experts.	O'Hagan	et	al.	(2006)	suggest	that	experts	
should	 be	 informed	 about	 why	 their	 judgement	 is	 sought	 and	 how	 the	 results	 of	 the	
elicitation	will	 be	used.	 Furthermore,	 it	 is	 suggested	 that	 a	 record	 is	 kept	 and	 that	 its	
purpose	 is	 explained	clearly	 to	 the	experts.	 Jenkinson	 (2005)	also	points	out	 that	 it	 is	
important	to	establish	a	good	bond	with	the	experts	and	provide	them	with	support	and	
encouragement	 in	 the	 elicitation	 process.	 This	 is	 followed	 by	 structuring	 and	
decomposition,	which	is	a	stage	of	defining	precisely	the	quantities	to	be	elicited	and	the	
format	of	the	elicitation	(Cooke	and	Goossens,	2000).		
	
Expert	 knowledge	 can	 be	 divided	 into	 substantive	 and	normative.	 The	 first	 applies	 to	
knowledge	and	experience	of	the	field	in	question	while	the	latter	is	related	to	the	form	of	
response	desired	in	the	elicitation.	The	response	mode	could	be	probabilities,	ranks	or	
pairwise	comparisons	(Meyer	and	Booker,	2001).	Some	experts	might	be	familiar	with	
the	response	mode	chosen	and	some	may	not,	thus	highlighting	the	need	for	probability	
training.		
	
The	five	initiating	steps	are	taken	in	preparation	for	the	actual	elicitation.		Garthwaite	et	
al.	(2005)	describe	the	process	of	eliciting	probability	distributions	as	follows:		
	 	
1. The	setup.	Incorporate	the	five	initiating	steps	already	described.	
2. Elicit	the	summaries	of	the	expert’s	distributions	regarding	the	areas	of	interest.	
This	is	the	main	stage	of	the	expert	elicitation	process.		
3. Fit	a	probability	distribution	to	the	elicited	summaries	in	step	2.	
4. Assess	the	adequacy	of	the	elicitation.	Here	the	elicitation	can	also	go	back	to	step	
2	to	elicit	more	summaries	in	an	iterative	process.		
	
5.2.4. SHELF	
SHELF	is	an	expert	elicitation	framework	developed	by	O'Hagan	and	Oakley	(2010).	It	is	
openly	available	to	anyone	who	wishes	to	use	it	and	it	is	applied	in	this	thesis.	It	provides	
a	 formal	 procedure	 for	 an	 elicitation	 process	 and	 improves	 quality	 and	 defensibility.	
SHELF	is	a	tool	and	provides	advice	and	guidance	on	the	process	for	a	facilitator.	SHELF	
can	be	applied	to	elicit	distributions	for	one	or	more	experts	as	a	group	and	the	package	
provides	several	possibilities	 for	eliciting	a	distribution.	These	are:	 the	P	 (Probability)	
method,	where	probabilities	are	derived	from	the	experts;	the	Q	(Quartile)	method,	where	
the	expert	is	asked	to	estimate	the	median	and	upper	and	lower	quartiles;	the	R	(Roulette)	
method,	where	the	facilitator	asks	for	probabilities	of	ranges	of	values	within	ten	bins,	
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and	the	T	(Tertile)	method,	where	the	median	and	upper	and	lower	tertiles	are	requested	
from	the	expert.		
	
Initially,	 the	 elicitation	 should	 be	 done	 individually,	 after	 which	 the	 group	 makes	 a	
common	elicitation.	Each	of	these	steps	is	presented	in	forms	the	facilitator	and	experts	
can	use	to	go	through	the	elicitation	process.	During	elicitation,	 the	experts	are	shown	
distributions	corresponding	to	their	answers.	These	should	be	computed	in	real	time	and	
the	SHELF	package	 includes	procedures	adapted	 to	 the	 statistical	 software	package	R,	
Rpanel,	 for	 performing	 this.	 By	 visualising	 the	 distributions,	 the	 experts	 are	 given	 the	
opportunity	 to	 provide	 feedback	 and	 revise	 their	 estimations	 in	 order	 to	 produce	 the	
distribution	they	believe	in.			
5.3. Oil	spill	trajectory	modelling	and	Seatrack	Web	
In	 order	 to	 adequately	 determine	 the	 spreading	 of	 oil	 discharge	 in	 the	 marine	
environment,	oil	spill	trajectory	modelling	is	required.	One	example	of	such	a	tool	is	the	
Spill	 Impact	 Model	 Application	 Package	 (SIMAP),	 which	 comprises	 three‐dimensional	
models	for	biological	effects	and	oil	fates.	It	can	be	run	in	a	stochastic	mode	for	analysis	
of	the	probability	of	different	outcomes	(McCay	et	al.,	2004).	
	
Another	tool	that	provides	the	possibility	of	modelling	oil	spill	trajectories,	and	which	is	
applied	in	the	Baltic	Sea,	is	Seatrack	web.	Due	to	its	availability	to	Swedish	authorities,	it	
has	been	chosen	for	the	work	at	hand.	The	user	provides	the	date,	location	and	amount	of	
possible	discharge	and	Seatrack	Web	uses	available	meteorological	and	hydrological	data	
to	 estimate	 a	 trajectory.	 Results	 are	 provided	 as	 amounts	 of	 hazardous	 material	
transported	 to	 the	 seabed,	 water	 surface	 and	 shore	 (SMHI,	 2015;	 SMHI,	 2011).	 The	
trajectory	estimation	is	based	on	forcing	(forecasts	of	flow	and	wind	fields)	and	the	oil	
drift	model	PADM	(Particle	Dispersion	Model),	and	is	presented	in	a	graphical,	web‐based	
interface.	The	forcing	fields	are	based	on	ocean	and	weather	forecasts	at	SMHI	(Swedish	
Meteorological	and	Hydrological	Institute),	i.e.	the	HIRLAM	(High	Resolution	Local	Area	
Modelling)	for	weather	forecasts,	and	HIROM	(High	Resolution	Operational	Model	for	the	
Baltic)	for	ocean	forecasts.	Longer	periods	of	forcing	weather	fields	are	modelled	by	the	
European	Centre	for	Medium‐Range	Weather	Forecasts.	The	principal	areas	covered	by	
Seatrack	Web	are	the	Baltic	Sea,	Kattegat,	Skagerrak	and	the	North	Sea	to	around	3°	east.	
The	PADM	has	been	developed	by	the	Danish	Maritime	Safety	Administration	(DAMSA)	
and	SMHI	and	the	graphical	interface	by	SMHI.	For	further	technical	details,	see	Liungman	
and	Mattson	(2011).	
5.4. Oil	spill	impact	and	the	Digital	Environmental	Atlas	
Estimation	of	oil	spill	impact	should	contain	ecological	and	socioeconomic	aspects.	Tools	
that	 can	 aid	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 impact	 could	 include	 e.g.	 sensitivity	 mapping	 of	 the	
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coastline,	 mapping	 of	 tourist	 areas,	 the	 businesses	 possibly	 affected,	 environmentally	
protected	areas,	sensitivity	estimations	of	species	in	the	area.		
	
The	 Digital	 Environmental	 Atlas	 is	 applied	 in	 this	 thesis	 and	maps	 the	 Swedish	 coast	
according	to	sensitivity	to	oil	spill	and	physical	characteristics.	The	sensitivity	mapping	is	
based	on	the	type	of	shore,	its	exposure	and	to	some	extent	on	biological	prerequisites.	
(Kulander	et	al.,	2010).		The	tool	is	openly	available	on	the	web	and	is	administered	by	the	
County	Administrative	Board	of	Västra	Götaland	(County	Administrative	Board	of	Västra	
Götaland,	2015).	
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6. 	VRAKA	–	a	comprehensive	model	for	risk	
assessment	of	shipwrecks	
VRAKA	–	 the	 comprehensive	model	 for	 risk	assessment	of	 shipwrecks,	was	developed	
based	 on	 the	 conclusions	 from	 Paper	 I	 and	 the	 framework	 for	 risk	 management	 of	
shipwrecks.	The	purpose	of	VRAKA	is	to	facilitate	risk	assessment,	including	risk	analysis	
and	 risk	 evaluation	 (Figure	 10).	 Risk	 analysis	 involves	 scope	 definition,	 hazard	
identification	and	risk	estimation.	Scope	definition	is	a	task	for	the	assessor,	i.e.	it	involves	
deciding	which	wrecks	will	be	included	in	the	assessment	while	hazard	identification	and	
risk	 estimation	 are	 performed	 in	 VRAKA.	 VRAKA	 also	 provides	 a	 means	 for	 risk	
evaluation.	As	shown	in		
Figure	10,	VRAKA	can	be	applied	to	provide	decision‐support	regarding	prioritisation	of	
mitigation	measures	for	wrecks.	Aspects	linked	to	implementation	and	monitoring	as	part	
of	risk	reduction	and	control	are	not	included.	
	
	
 
	
Figure	10.	VRAKA	in	relation	to	the	risk	management	process	after	(Paper	IV).	
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The	VRAKA	model	can	be	described	as	consisting	of	three	parts:	Part	I	–	Estimation	of	the	
probability	of	discharge,	Part	II	–	Consequence	assessment	and	Part	II	–	Risk	evaluation	
(Figure	11).	Part	I	is	a	method	based	on	fault	tree	analysis	describing	the	combination	of	
activities	 possibly	 leading	 to	 an	 opening	 in	 the	 wreck	 and	 a	 possible	 discharge	 of	
hazardous	substances.	Part	II	is	an	aggregation	of	methods	for	consequence	assessment	
of	a	potential	discharge.	The	assessment	can	be	performed	according	 to	a	 three‐tiered	
structure.	The	choice	of	tier,	or	level	of	detail,	is	made	with	respect	to	level	of	ambition	
and	 available	 resources.	 Part	 I	 is	 described	 in	 Papers	 II‐IV	 and	 is	 summarised	 in	 this	
chapter	 in	 Section	 6.1.	 Part	 II	 is	 described	 in	 Paper	 V	 and	 is	 also	 summarised	 in	 this	
chapter	in	Section	6.2.	Part	III,	risk	evaluation,	is	discussed	further	in	Section	6.3.	
	
	
 
Figure	11.	The	three	parts	of	VRAKA.	
6.1. Part	1	–	Estimation	of	the	probability	of	discharge	
The	probability	of	discharge	is	modelled	using	a	fault	tree	(Figure	12)	and	two	events	are	
deemed	 necessary	 for	 discharge;	 an	 opening	 in	 the	 wreck	 occurs	 and	 hazardous	
substances	are	present.	An	opening	in	the	wreck	is	assumed	to	be	a	result	of	one	or	more	
activities,	and	hazardous	substances	are	assumed	to	be	present	if	either	the	fuel	or	bunker	
is	hazardous	and	is	still	contained	in	the	wreck.	The	development	of	the	VRAKA	fault	tree	
model	 is	described	in	Papers	II	and	IV.	An	important	difference	between	Papers	II	and	
Paper	IV	is	that	 in	the	latter	there	has	been	an	important	revision	of	the	mathematical	
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foundation,	by	inclusion	of	Bayesian	updating,	regarding	how	the	opening	probability	is	
calculated.	 Paper	 IV	 is	 presented	 here	 directly	 after	 Paper	 II	 to	 clearly	 display	 these	
differences.	Extensive	efforts	have	also	been	made	to	collect	more	input	information	for	
the	model	and	these	are	described	separately	in	Paper	III.		
	
	
	
Figure	12.	A	schematic	fault	tree	structure	of	VRAKA	from	Paper	III.		
	
6.1.1. A	first	version	of	the	fault	tree	model	–	Paper	II	
Hazardous	activities	that	are	assumed	to	possibly	cause	an	opening	in	a	shipwreck	were	
identified	through	a	literature	review	(Etkin	et	al.,	2009;	Louzis	et	al.,	2009;	Michel	et	al.,	
2005;	Sender,	2011)	and	brainstorming	sessions	with	experts.	The	activities	are	further	
described	in	Section	2.1.	A	workshop	that	brought	together	experts	in	this	field	was	also	
held	 as	 part	 of	 the	 process	 of	 developing	 the	 fault	 tree	method.	 The	 output	 from	 the	
workshop	 served	 as	 input	 for	 further	 work	 relating	 to	 e.g.	 the	 choice	 of	 hazardous	
activities.	
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Each	activity	was	represented	by	an	intensity,	 i.e.	the	frequency	of	occurrence,	and	the	
probability	of	an	opening	in	the	wreck	given	the	occurrence	of	the	activity.	An	exception	
was	corrosion,	which	was	described	directly	as	 the	probability	of	opening	since	 it	was	
assumed	to	be	a	continuous	process	and	not	of	the	same	nature	as	the	other	activities.	A	
generic	probability	of	opening	was	estimated	for	each	hazardous	activity	(Popening|acvtivity,i)	
by	 a	 group	of	 experts	and	 the	 risk	 assessor	 sets	 indicator	values	 and	estimates	of	 the	
frequency	of	the	activity	(λoccurrence,i).		
	
Necessary	input	data	were	estimated	by	a	group	of	experts,	who	were	asked	to	assign	the	
highest	reasonable	the	probability	of	each	activity	causing	an	opening	in	a	shipwreck.	To	
describe	the	uncertainties	of	the	probability	estimations,	the	values	given	by	the	experts	
were	 interpreted	 as	 the	 90th	 percentile	 of	 beta	 distributions.	 The	 percentiles	 and	 the	
estimated	 parameters	 they	 are	 selected	 to	 represent	 are	 a	 way	 of	 representing	 the	
reliability	 of	 the	 expert	 judgements.	 A	 higher	 percentile	means	 that	 the	 probability	 of	
opening	is	more	certain	to	be	lower	than	the	expert	judgement.	The	shape	parameter	α	of	
the	 beta	 distribution	was	 set	 at	 a	 value	 of	 1,	 implying	 that	 the	most	 like	 value	 of	 the	
probability	of	an	opening	is	0.	This	was	estimated	to	be	reasonable,	giving	that	there	is	
currently	no	 information	available	 in	Sweden	regarding	a	 large	discharge	of	oil	 from	a	
shipwreck.	
	
Twelve	indicators	were	found	to	affect	the	generic	probability.	These	were	physical	and	
environmental	factors	that	could	influence	the	deterioration	rate	and	the	circumstances	
in	which	the	activities	operated.	The	indicators	were	identified	through	the	literature	and	
brainstorming	sessions	with	experts	(Louzis	et	al.,	2009;	Michel	et	al.,	2005;	Etkin	et	al.,	
2009;	Sender,	2011).	The	 indicators	are	presented	 in	Chapter	2.1,	although	 in	the	 first	
version	of	the	fault	tree	model,	the	indicators	Maintenance	and	Ship	construction	were	also	
included.		
	
In	Paper	II,	a	semi‐quantitative	structure	was	set	up	to	describe	how	the	twelve	indicators	
affected	the	probability	of	opening	due	to	the	hazardous	activities.	The	model	was	initially	
set	at	a	normal	state	and	the	assessor	could	change	this	by	either	decreasing	or	increasing	
the	 robustness	 of	 the	 wreck	 or	 environmental	 prerequisites	 on	 a	 scale	 from	 a	
‘considerably	better’	to	a	‘considerably	worse’	state.	In	total,	five	options	were	available.		
The	magnitude	of	 the	change	was	pre‐set	 in	 the	model.	This	 could	be	 repeated	by	 the	
assessor	 for	all	 the	 indicators	and	 the	probability	of	activities	 causing	an	opening	was	
altered	with	respect	to	the	state	of	the	indicators.	With	the	derived	expert	information,	an	
expected	value,	µprior,	was	estimated.	The	assessor	information	regarding	indicators	was	
used	to	update	the	beta	distributions	from	µprior	to	µupdated.	During	the	updating,	the	sum	
of	alpha	and	beta	was	kept	constant,	 indicating	that	no	new	information	regarding	the	
uncertainty	of	the	probability	estimation	was	provided.	
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The	probability	of	an	opening	as	a	result	of	a	specific	activity	was	also	described	by	the	
frequency	 or	 rate	 of	 occurrence	 of	 the	 activity.	 This	 was	 modelled	 using	 gamma	
distributions	and	the	assessor	was	provided	with	fixed	intervals.	
	
Furthermore,	the	assessor	estimated	the	probability	that	there	was	a	hazardous	
substance	present	in	the	wreck	in	three	steps:	
1. Estimation	of	the	probability	that	there	is	bunker	remaining.	
2. Estimation	of	the	probability	that	there	is	cargo	remaining.	
3. Estimation	of	the	probability	that	the	cargo	is	hazardous.	
	
The	assessments	regarding	the	probability	of	remaining	bunker	and	cargo	and	whether	
the	 cargo	was	 hazardous	were	 performed	 qualitatively.	 Possible	 choices	 ranged	 from	
Impossible	and	Very	low	to	Very	high	and	Certain.	It	was	also	possible	to	set	No	information.	
Values	 corresponding	 to	 the	 different	 classes	 were	 set	 by	 the	 authors	 enabling	
quantitative	description	of	uncertainties.	
	
The	certainty	of	 these	assessments	 from	Low	uncertainty	 to	High	uncertainty	was	also	
estimated.	All	assessments	regarding	the	volume	of	bunker	and	cargo	and	whether	the	
cargo	was	 environmentally	 hazardous	 or	 not,	were	made	 using	 guiding	matrices.	 The	
uncertainties	of	possible	choices	were	represented	by	beta	distributions.	The	choice	of	
certainty	category	altered	the	upper	credibility	limit.	The	assessment,	for	example,	would	
be	interpreted	as	the	85th	percentile	if	the	assessor	set	a	high	uncertainty	and	the	95th	
percentile	if	uncertainty	was	set	as	low.		
	
The	amount	of	hazardous	material	contained	in	the	wreck	was	also	estimated.	A	smallest	
and	highest	 reasonable	 amount	was	 interpreted	as	 the	10th	and	90th	percentiles	of	 a	
lognormal	distribution.		
	
6.1.2. The	novel	fault	tree	–	Paper	IV	
In	Paper	IV,	a	novel	fault	tree	based	on	the	fault	tree	of	Paper	II	is	presented.	This	fault	
tree	contains	 the	same	potentially	hazardous	activities	as	 the	previous	 fault	 tree.	Each	
activity	 is	 again	 described	 in	 the	 form	 of	 frequency	 of	 occurrence	 and	 probability	 of	
opening.	However,	the	means	of	calculating	the	probability	of	opening	differs	(Figure	13).	
	
The	 integration	 of	 the	 effect	 of	 site‐	 and	 wreck‐specific	 indicators	 on	 the	 generic	
probability	of	opening	is	now	made	by	formal	Bayesian	updating.	Furthermore,	the	simple	
expert	estimations	regarding	a	generic	probability	of	opening	in	the	first	fault	tree	version	
were	replaced	by	information	acquired	during	an	expert	elicitation	workshop	(Paper	III).	
Secondly,	 the	 effect	 of	 site‐specific	 and	wreck‐specific	 indicators	 on	 the	 probability	 of	
opening	was	also	estimated	by	experts	at	the	above‐mentioned	workshop.	This	was	 in	
contrast	to	Paper	II,	where	the	authors	made	initial	estimations.	It	should	also	be	noted	
that	the	initial	estimations	were	made	for	another	type	of	structure	where	the	effect	of	
indicators	were	displayed	as	deviation	from	a	“normal”	wreck‐status.		
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Figure	13.	The	novel	fault	tree	model	for	VRAKA	according	to	Paper	IV.	
	
For	each	activity,	the	effect	of	the	indicators	was	evaluated	and	described	by	means	of	
uncertainty	distributions.	An	assessor	can	assign	values	for	indicators	at	the	specific	site	
and	wreck	and	only	the	part	of	the	distribution	estimated	by	experts	that	is	valid	for	the	
wreck	 in	question	 is	 applied	 in	 the	model.	The	prior	probability	 of	 opening	due	 to	 an	
activity, ܲሺܨ௝ሻ,	is	thus	updated	based	on	the	status	of	the	site‐specific	and	wreck‐specific	
parameters	 to	 a	 posterior	 estimation	ܲ൫ܨ௝หݔଵ, … , ݔ௡൯.	 This	 facilitates	 a	mathematically	
correct	aggregation	of	the	probability	of	opening	and	indicators	concerning	the	specific	
site	and	wreck	and	is	enabled	by	the	expert	elicitation	(Paper	III).	The	model	has	thus	
been	 refined	 compared	 to	 Paper	 II	 and	 now	provides	 probabilistic	 Bayesian	 updating	
incorporating	uncertainties	through	the	application	of	Monte	Carlo	simulation.		
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The	frequency	of	hazardous	activities	is	assigned	on	a	continuous	scale	rather	than	as	a	
choice	of	pre‐set	suggestions	as	was	the	case	in	Paper	II.	The	assessor	estimates	the	lowest	
reasonable	and	highest	reasonable	number	of	occurrences	per	year	for	the	activities,	that	
can	physically	affect	the	wreck.	This	is	interpreted	as	the	10th	and	90th	percentile	of	a	
gamma	distribution.		
	 	 	 	 	 	
The	 probability	 that	 hazardous	 substances	 are	 still	 contained	 in	 the	 wreck	 and	 the	
probability	that	the	cargo	is	hazardous	and	is	still	contained	in	the	wreck	is	estimated	in	
the	 same	 way	 as	 in	 Paper	 II.	 However,	 in	 Paper	 IV,	 the	 approach	 for	 modelling	 the	
uncertainty	of	these	parameters	is	altered.	The	probability	of	the	estimated	parameter	is	
modelled	 using	 a	 beta	 distribution	 where	 the	 sum	 of	 the	 shape	 parameters	 α	 and	 β	
represents	the	uncertainty	or	total	 information	available.	Sums	are	assigned	to	classes,	
where	a	high	level	of	uncertainty	is	represented	by	a	lower	sum	of	α	and	β	and	vice	versa.	
Classes	of	uncertainty	from	Impossible	to	Certain	as	well	as	No	information	are	available	
to	the	assessor.	
 
6.1.3. Expert	elicitation	–	Paper	III	
As	pointed	out	in	the	conclusions	in	Paper	II,	the	input	from	experts	took	the	form	of	rough	
estimations	and	there	was	an	apparent	need	for	more	robust	expert	elicitation	in	order	to	
obtain	input	for	the	VRAKA	model.	A	workshop	at	which	more	than	twenty	experts	were	
brought	together	was	held	to	retrieve	necessary	input	information	for	the	VRAKA	model.	
The	workshop	was	based	on	the	Sheffield	Elicitation	Framework	(SHELF),	as	described	in	
Section	5.2	(O'Hagan	and	Oakley,	2010).	
	
Groups	for	elicitation	were	formed	based	on	the	experts’	knowledge.	Experts	were	asked	
to	 estimate	 the	 probability	 of	 a	 specific	 activity	 causing	 an	 opening	 in	 a	 shipwreck.	
Furthermore,	 estimations	 were	 made	 regarding	 the	 state	 of	 site‐specific	 and	 wreck‐
specific	indicators,	given	that	opening	and	no	opening	had	occurred	due	to	a	particular	
activity.	The	latter	estimations	are	applied	in	VRAKA	to	update	the	generic	probabilities	
of	opening	due	to	different	activities	and	to	estimate	the	joint	probability	of	opening	for	
the	wreck	 in	 question.	 The	workshop	 also	 resulted	 in	 two	 indicators	 being	 removed,	
Maintenance	and	Ship	Construction,	and	some	combinations	of	 indicators	and	activities	
were	found	to	be	irrelevant.	In	Table	3	an	overview	is	provided	of	which	indicators	were	
assumed	to	have	an	influence	on	which	activities.	
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Table	3.	Summary	of	elicited	influence	or	no	influence	of	indicators	on	activities.	Influence	is	shown	as	“Y”	with	a	light	
grey	background	and	no	influence	as	“N”	with	a	dark	grey	background	(Paper	III).	
	
	
The	workshop	resulted	 in	92	probability	distributions,	representing	the	uncertainty	of	
the	state	of	indicators	in	relation	to	the	probability	of	opening	or	no	opening	as	a	result	of	
each	of	the	hazardous	activities.	Furthermore,	eight	distributions	were	elicited,	describing	
the	generic	probability	of	opening	due	to	each	of	the	activities.	Examples	of	distributions	
are	presented	in	Figure	14,	the	generic	probability	of	opening	due	to	Construction	work,	
and	in	Figure	15,	the	uncertainty	distribution	for	Hull	thickness	if	an	opening	has	occurred	
due	to	shipping	traffic.		
	
	
 
Figure	14.	The	probability	of	opening	due	to	construction	work.	
	
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Beta: = 1 = 1.43
Construction
25th percentile
50th percentile
75th percentile
Summary	of	collected	data	regarding	indicators	(Data	was	only	elicited	where	experts	found	there	was	a	
connection).	
	 Construct‐
ion	
Diving	 Military	
activity	
Deterior‐
ation	
Shipping	
traffic	
Unstable	
seabed	
Storms	 Trawling	
Average	bottom	water	
oxygen	concentration	 N	 N	 N	 Y	 N	 N	 N	 N	
Average	bottom	water	
salinity	 N	 N	 N	 Y	 N	 N	 N	 N	
Average	bottom	water	
temperature	 N	 N	 N	 Y	 N	 N	 N	 N	
Average	bottom	water	
current	speed	 Y	 Y	 N	 Y	 N	 N	 N	 N	
Ship	use	 N	 N	 N	 Y	 Y	 Y	 Y	 N	
Average	hull	thickness	 Y	 Y	 Y	 Y	 Y	 Y	 Y	 Y	
Seabed	character	 Y	 N	 Y	 Y	 Y	 Y	 Y	 Y	
Wreck	position	on	
seabed	 Y	 N	 Y	 Y	 Y	 Y	 Y	 Y	
Depth	 Y	 Y	 N	 N	 Y	 Y	 Y	 Y	
Time	since	sinking	 Y	 Y	 Y	 Y	 Y	 Y	 Y	 Y	
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Figure	15.	Uncertainty	distribution	for	the	Hull	thickness	indicator,	given	that	an	opening	has	occurred	due	to	Shipping	
traffic.	
 
6.2. Part	2	–	Consequence	assessment	–	Paper	V	
Estimation	 of	 consequences	 in	 VRAKA	 can	 be	 performed	 in	 three	 tiers	 depending	 on	
available	resources,	data	and	demands	regarding	the	results.	In	tier	1,	risk	is	described	as	
the	expected	volume	of	oil	 and	potential	hazardous	 cargo	discharged.	Tier	2	applies	a	
matrix	 combining	 volume,	 distance	 to	 shore	 and	 shoreline	 sensitivity	 to	 estimate	 the	
consequence	(Table	4).	Risk	is	described	as	the	outcome	of	the	matrix	combined	with	the	
probability	of	discharge.	Tier	3	is	an	aggregation	of	results	from	Sea	Track	Web	for	oil	spill	
trajectory	 modelling	 and	 the	 Digital	 Environmental	 Atlas	 containing	 information	 on	
shoreline	sensitivity	to	oil	spill.	
	
Table	4.	Tier	2	Consequence	assessment	in	VRAKA.	Based	on	Kulander	et	al.	(2010)	and	the	DEEPP	project	(Alcaro	et	al.,	
2007)	according	to	Paper	III.	
Low  
severity 
Moderate 
severity 
High  
severity 
Volume < 10 m3 10 – 500 m3  > 500 m3  
Distance to shore > 10 nautical miles 1 – 10 nautical miles < 1 nautical mile 
Sensitivity Nearest shore is: Sandy, 
steep cliffs or rock walls 
or facilities. 
Nearest shore is: 
Cliff beaches, pebble, 
boulder or gravel 
beaches.  
Nearest shore is:  
Reed beds, meadows, 
fine sediment beaches. or 
mixed beaches 
	
Having	 the	opportunity	 to	 apply	 consequence	assessment	 in	 three	 tiers	 allows	 for	 the	
possibility	of	adapting	the	assessment	to	the	level	of	ambition	and	resources	available.	
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Gamma: k = 0.91 = 0.81
Hull thickness - Shipping traffic - Opening
25th percentile
50th percentile
75th percentile
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However,	it	should	be	noted	that	the	selection	of	a	tier	will	have	an	impact	on	the	type	of	
results	that	can	be	obtained	and	how	these	can	or	should	be	used.	If,	for	example,	tier	1	is	
applied,	the	consequences	will	depend	solely	on	the	expected	volume	of	oil	discharged.	
Applying	a	specific	tier	thus	involves	making	a	decision	regarding	what	the	results	will	
encompass.		
	
This	 reasoning	 also	 brings	 us	 to	 a	 fundamental	 aspect	 of	 risk	 assessment	 and	
management.	 Developing	 models	 and	 performing	 risk	 assessment	 involves	 making	
decisions	and	choices.	Even	with	the	aim	of	keeping	this	process	free	from	bias	and	leaving	
decisions	 to	 the	 decision‐makers	 and	 later	 steps	 in	 the	 risk	management	 process,	 the	
developed	models	and	tools	will	 inevitably	be	coloured	by	the	developers’	background	
and	assumptions.		
6.3. Part	3	–	Risk	Evaluation	in	VRAKA	
Results	 from	 VRAKA	 can	 be	 used	 to	 compare	 wrecks	 and	 for	 deciding	 which	 wrecks	
warrant	action.	The	estimated	risk	can	be	compared	as	a	measure	itself	(tier	1)	or	the	two	
components	 –	 probability	 of	 discharge	 and	 the	 consequences	 –	 can	 be	 compared	
separately	(all	tiers).	If	several	wrecks	are	within	a	close	distance,	such	groups	can	also	
be	compared	to	other	groups	since	combined	probabilities	and	consequences	can	produce	
other	results.	Furthermore,	remediation	costs	could	perhaps	be	lowered	by	coordinating	
operations.	
	
In	the	case	of	risk	evaluation,	i.e.	making	risk	tolerability	decisions	and	analysing	options,	
no	specific	component	of	VRAKA	is	applicable.	Deciding	on	risk	criteria	and	what	risk	is	
tolerable	is	up	to	the	assessor	or	decision‐maker.	However,	the	main	benefit	of	VRAKA	is	
that	 it	 can	 be	 applied	 to	 estimate	 the	 relative	 risk	 between	 wrecks	 and	 priorities	
mitigation	measures	to	evaluate	the	risk	reduction	options.		
	
In	simple	terms,	risk	reduction	can	be	achieved	by	either	decreasing	the	probability	of	an	
activity	 or	 reducing	 the	 consequences.	 VRAKA	 can	 for	 example	 be	 used	 to	 analyse	 a	
change	in	the	probability	of	discharge	of	hazardous	substances	by	reducing	the	frequency	
of	a	hazardous	activity	and	comparing	 the	risk	related	 to	 the	current	 frequency	of	 the	
activity	with	a	reduced	frequency.		
6.4. A	tool	for	applying	VRAKA	
VRAKA	has	 also	been	 realised	 in	 the	 form	of	 an	Excel‐based	 tool.	 It	 includes	 two	 files	
containing	a	number	of	sheets	that	guide	the	assessor	through	the	risk	estimation	(Figure	
16).	 	Hereafter	 follows	a	brief	overview	of	 the	 tool.	Further	description	 is	provided	 in	
Appendix	A1.	
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Figure	16.	Schematic	view	of	the	tool	for	applying	VRAKA	(VRAKA,	Probabilistic	risk	assessment	of	shipwrecks,	Handbook.	
Version	Oct.	2016).		
Figure  17	 shows	 the	 structure	 of	 VRAKA	 in	 Excel.	 The	 purpose	 of	 a	 more	 detailed	
presentation	is	to	clarify	how	uncertainties	are	included	in	the	risk	estimation.	VRAKA	is	
separated	into	two	files	due	to	practicalities	relating	to	Crystal	Ball.	The	calculations	in	
file	one	should	be	performed	before	the	calculations	in	file	two.	The	former	serves	as	input	
to	the	latter	and	thus	cannot	be	performed	simultaneously.	File	1	contains	information	
from	the	expert	elicitation	regarding	site‐specific	and	wreck‐specific	parameters.	This	is	
updated	based	on	the	values	for	the	wreck	in	question	assigned	by	the	user	of	VRAKA.	In	
the	 second	 file,	 all	 the	 remaining	 calculations	 and	 simulations	 are	 performed.	 The	
consequence	of	this	separation	is	that	sensitivity	analysis	will	need	to	be	performed	in	
two	steps.		
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Figure	17.	The	structure	of	VRAKA	in	the	Excel‐based	tool.	CB	is	an	abbreviation	of	Crystal	Ball,	an	add‐in	software	for	
Monte	Carlo	simulations.	
47	
 
7. 	Discussion	
Potentially	 polluting	 shipwrecks	 are	 a	 growing	 environmental	 threat	 and	 adequate	
decision	 support	 is	 needed	 to	 cope	 with	 the	 problem.	 The	 risk	 from	 shipwrecks	 is	
influenced	by	numerous	and	uncertain	variables	and	the	interaction	of	these	variables	is	
a	truly	complex	matter.	Data	are	typically	lacking	and	gathering	further	information	could	
be	costly	or,	for	various	other	reasons,	difficult	to	achieve.	Handling	of	these	uncertainties	
is	necessary	in	order	to	obtain	proper	risk	assessment	results	and	decision	support.	This	
thesis	initially	identified	a	need	for	further	research	on	risk	assessment	of	shipwrecks.	A	
framework	for	structuring	and	guiding	development	as	well	as	risk	management	was	then	
suggested	 and	 a	model	 for	 risk	 assessment	 of	 wrecks	 (VRAKA)	was	 developed	 as	 an	
integral	part	of	the	framework.	VRAKA	can	be	applied	to	prioritise	mitigation	measures	
and	resource	allocation	for	potentially	polluting	shipwrecks	based	on	scientifically	well‐
founded	input	acquired	through	probabilistic	risk	assessment.	
7.1. A	generic	framework	
The	 framework	 was	 developed	 based	 on	 a	 comparison	 of	 identified	 methods	 and	
approaches	currently	applied	to	shipwrecks	(Paper	I).	It	was	shown	that	at	the	time	of	the	
study	 there	was	no	 comprehensive	method	 for	 shipwrecks	 and	none	 that	 facilitated	a	
quantitative	assessment.	The	analysis	was	further	developed	in	Chapter	3	of	this	thesis,	
which	 include	 additional,	 recently	 developed	 approaches.	 It	 was	 concluded	 that	
consequence	assessment	is	now	in	general	more	solid	but	there	is	no	fully	probabilistic	
approach	 that	 takes	uncertainties	 into	account.	The	 suggested	 framework	 stresses	 the	
link	between	risk	assessment	and	decision‐making	and	presents	a	holistic	structure	based	
on	well‐established	views	of	risk	management.	Hence,	the	framework	argues	in	favour	of	
a	proactive	approach.		
7.2. VRAKA	–	a	comprehensive	model	
Due	 to	 the	 complex	 nature	 of	 the	 risks	 posed	 by	 shipwrecks	 and	 the	 inherent	
uncertainties,	it	is	crucial	to	apply	a	structured	and	probabilistic	approach.	The	VRAKA	
model	therefore	comprises	a	probabilistic	method,	with	explicit	handling	of	uncertainties,	
for	estimating	the	probability	of	discharge	and	an	aggregation	of	methods	for	estimating	
the	consequences.		
7.2.1. A	fault	tree	method	
Several	 methods	 for	 logical	 modelling	 exists.	 The	 fault	 three	 was	 chosen	 due	 to	 its	
possibility	 to	 provide	 structure	 and	 transparency	 to	 the	 problem.	 Furthermore,	 the	
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mathematical	 framework	 suits	 the	 conceptual	model	 of	 VRAKA	 and	 probabilistic	 risk	
assessment	of	shipwrecks	well.			Applying	a	probabilistic	approach	allows	uncertainties	
to	be	taken	into	account	in	input	data	and	results.	In	VRAKA,	a	fault	tree	was	developed	
and	applied	to	calculate	the	probability	of	discharge	of	hazardous	substances.	The	fault	
tree	combines	the	probability	of	an	opening	occurring	in	the	wreck	with	the	probability	
that	 there	 is	hazardous	material	 inside	the	wreck.	Statistical	distributions	describe	the	
uncertainties	 of	 input	 data	 and	 through	 the	 use	 of	 Monte	 Carlo	 simulation	 the	
uncertainties	of	the	results	can	be	calculated	and	displayed.		
	
A	probabilistic	approach	also	allows	for	sensitivity	and	uncertainty	analysis.	Uncertainty	
analysis	 facilitates	 an	 explicit	 representation	 of	 uncertainties	 in	 input	 data	 and	 their	
effects	on	the	model	outputs.	Sensitivity	analysis	makes	it	possible	to	identify	which	input	
variables	 contribute	 most	 to	 output	 uncertainty,	 and	 thus	 provides	 guidance	 on	
determining	which	additional	information	should	be	prioritised	in	order	to	achieve	more	
reliable	risk	calculations.	The	user	of	VRAKA	can	also	run	different	scenarios	in	order	to	
see	how	the	risk	is	affected	and	thus	evaluate	possible	measure	for	reducing	the	risk.	
	
7.2.2. Consequence	assessment	
Depending	on	the	purpose	of	the	risk	assessment	and	available	resources,	VRAKA	makes	
possible	 the	selection	of	a	 relevant	 tier	 for	making	a	 consequence	assessment.	VRAKA	
offers	three	tiers	of	increasing	refinement:	a	first	tier	where	the	amount	of	oil	serves	as	a	
proxy	for	consequences,	a	second	tier	where	a	sensitivity	matrix	is	applied	to	describe	the	
consequences	(the	matrix	contains	the	volume	of	oil,	distance	to	shore	and	the	sensitivity	
of	the	specific	shore	type,	i.e.	a	semi‐quantitative	consequence	assessment.),	and	a	third	
tier	where	an	oil	spill	trajectory	tool	is	combined	with	sensitivity	mapping	of	the	coast.	
Uncertainties	 can	be	 taken	 into	 account	 to	 some	extent	 in	 the	 latter	 two	 since	 the	 set	
values	in	the	sensitivity	matrix	are	provided	as	an	interval	and	the	oil	spill	trajectory	tool	
can	 be	 run	 for	 several	 scenarios.	 Currently,	 none	 of	 the	 tiers	 provided	 offers	 a	
consequence	assessment	from	a	social	or	economic	point	of	view,	which	are	of	course	are	
crucial	areas	when	making	an	assessment	to	find	sustainable	solutions.	All	the	tiers	can	
however	at	present	offer	an	estimation	of	the	consequences	off	a	potential	discharge	of	
oil	that	can	serve	as	input	for	decision‐making.	The	consequence	assessment	of	VRAKA	
can	be	applied	to	compare	shipwrecks	independent	of	selection	of	tier	possible.	
	
7.2.3. Risk	estimation	
A	major	focus	of	this	work	was	to	develop	a	model	to	estimate	the	probability	of	discharge	
of	 oil	 and	 to	 illustrate	 how	 this	 estimation	 can	 be	 combined	 with	 different	 types	 of	
consequence	 assessments.	 Hence,	 to	 estimate	 the	 risk	 posed	 by	 potentially	 polluting	
shipwrecks.	
	
In	this	thesis	risk	is	defined	as	a	combination	of	probability	and	consequences.	However,	
different	means	for	combining	probability	and	consequences	are	applied	when	estimating	
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the	level	of	risk.	The	choice	of	how	to	present	the	risk	will	depend	on	the	aims	of	the	risk	
assessment.	Risk	can,	as	in	tier	1,	be	estimated	as	the	expected	value	of	the	discharged	
volume	of	hazardous	substance.	Using	this	approach,	the	user	must	be	aware	of	the	fact	
that	very	significant	consequences	can	be	obscured	by	a	small	probability	or	vice	versa	as	
mentioned	in	Chapter	2.	It	is	thus	important	to	be	aware	of	the	limitations	in	this	way	of	
expressing	 the	 risk.	 A	 separate	 analysis	 of	 the	 probability,	 the	 consequences,	 and	 the	
combined	risk	estimate	will	provide	a	more	holistic	picture	of	the	risk.	
		
Tiers	2	and	3	inherently	encourage	the	assessor	to	evaluate	the	probability	of	discharge	
and	 the	 consequences	 separately	 by	 not	 providing	 actual	 numbers	 representing	 the	
consequences.	The	assessor	thus	weighs	the	estimations	of	consequences	in	relation	to	
the	probability	of	discharge.	The	choice	of	tier	for	the	consequence	assessment	will	also	
involve	selecting	the	types	of	consequences	to	be	included.	An	assessor	must	always	be	
aware	of	and	take	into	account	how	the	choice	of	risk	definition	and	the	description	of	the	
consequences	 will	 affect	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 risk	 estimation	 when	 making	 the	 final	
decision.	
	
7.2.4. Risk	evaluation	
There	are	no	regulations	or	criteria	specifying	when	a	wreck	 is	a	 threat	 to	 the	marine	
environment	 to	 the	extent	 that	measures	should	be	 taken,	unless	a	 larger	discharge	 is	
underway.	 The	 role	 of	 the	 decision‐maker	 is	 therefore	 very	 important	 and	 the	 risk	
evaluation	 and	 comparison	 of	 wrecks	 imperative	 for	 supporting	 decision	 regarding	
mitigation	measures.	VRAKA	can	be	applied	to	prioritise	mitigation	measures	by	analysis	
of	 potential	 risk‐mitigation	 options.	 For	 example,	 by	 analysing	 the	 effect	 on	 results	 of	
decreasing	or	banning	shipping	traffic	in	the	area.		
	
Risk	mitigation	measures	in	terms	of	reduced	risk	level	could	also	be	evaluated	in	relation	
to	 the	 cost	 for	 such	mitigation	 using	 e.g.	 cost‐benefit	 analysis,	 thus	 implying	 that	 risk	
mitigation	must	also	be	valued	in	economic	terms.	The	cost	of	achieving	specific	risk	levels	
can	also	be	evaluated	by	cost	effectiveness	analysis,	in	order	to	find	which	alternative	that	
would	reach	a	specific	risk	criterion,	or	goal,	to	the	lowest	cost.		Another	example	is	multi	
criteria	decision	analysis,	which	takes	a	number	of	criteria	into	account.	
	
It	 is	 the	responsibility	of	 the	decision‐maker	to,	based	on	e.g.	 information	retrieved	by	
VRAKA,	decide	what	the	most	desirable	option	is.	For	example,	the	largest	risk	reduction	
to	the	lowest	cost	or	simply	a	reduction	of	the	largest	risk?	There	are	several	alternatives	
that	are	relevant	from	different	perspectives.	Although,	VRAKA	can	provide	support	and	
input	for	a	decision‐making	process	in	different	ways,	it	is	up	to	the	decision	maker	to	set	
the	goals	for	the	assessment	and	choose	the	proper	way,	e.g.	the	relevant	tier,	for	the	type	
of	decision	at	hand.	
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7.3. Expert	elicitation	
Information	is	scarce	on	shipwreck	conditions	and	data	derived	by	expert	elicitation	is	
essential	for	probabilistic	risk	assessment	of	shipwrecks.	Input	for	the	fault	tree	in	VRAKA	
was	derived	by	means	of	a	rigorous	expert	elicitation	process	where	experts	were	asked	
to	provide	their	subjective	beliefs	about	relevant	quantities	such	as	the	probability	of	an	
opening	in	a	shipwreck	du	to	hazardous	activities	and	the	influence	of	site‐specific	and	
wreck‐specific	indicators	on	that	probability.		
	
A	total	of	23	experts	from	various	areas	of	expertise	participated	in	the	elicitation.	An	ideal	
situation	 would	 have	 involved	 more	 experts	 to	 embody	 a	 wider	 common	 level	 of	
competence	in	all	the	groups.	Certain	experts	were	included	in	several	groups	for	some	of	
the	elicitations,	but	arranging	for	all	areas	of	knowledge	to	be	represented	for	all	issues	
was	not	possible	with	respect	to	the	time	available.	Although	efforts	were	made	to	invite	
a	large	number	of	experts,	it	was	not	possible	at	the	time	and	for	the	chosen	structure	of	
the	elicitation	to	attract	further	expertise.	An	alternative	could	have	been	to	run	several	
workshops	with	fewer	experts	on	each	occasion.	
	
Probabilistic	risk	assessment	of	shipwrecks	would	be	extremely	difficult	if	not	impossible	
if	expert	elicitation	was	not	performed.	Although	the	task	was	difficult,	it	is	important	to	
bear	in	mind	that	expert	knowledge	is	not	expressed	in	terms	of	precise	values	and	that	
uncertainties	were	also	taken	into	account.	
7.4. Validation	of	VRAKA	
Validation	in	absolute	terms	of	a	model	such	as	VRAKA	is	not	feasible	since	the	process	
modelled	cannot	be	controlled	and	is	not	possible	to	follow	up.	Such	action	would	include	
finding	a	large	number	of	wrecks	and	study	them	for	a	very	long	period	of	time	in	order	
to	 obtain	 statistically	 valid	 results.	 However,	 what	 can	 be	 done	 is	 to	 test	 real	 and	
hypothetical	wrecks	and	to	analyse	changes	in	input	data	in	relation	to	changes	in	results.		
	
VRAKA	has	been	tested	on	several	hypothetical	and	real	shipwrecks.	Results	show	how	
VRAKA	can	be	applied	to	estimate	the	risk	from	shipwrecks	in	terms	of	types	of	results	
and	how	uncertainty	and	sensitivity	analysis	can	be	performed.		
7.5. Outlook		
The	 problem	 of	 potentially	 hazardous	 shipwrecks	 is	 complex.	 Numerous	 authorities,	
companies,	universities	and	experts	are	involved.	The	Swedish	coastguard	will	act	if	oil	is	
found	 on	 beaches	 or	 on	 the	water	 surface,	 the	 Swedish	Maritime	 Administration	will	
remove	wrecks	 if	 they	 pose	 a	 threat	 to	 shipping	 traffic	while	 the	 Swedish	Agency	 for	
Marine	 and	 Water	 Management	 has	 overall	 responsibility.	 	 For	 a	 risk	 management	
process	 to	 be	 efficient,	 these	 organisations	 will	 have	 to	 cooperate.	 Data	 for	 risk	
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assessment	will	have	to	be	shared	as	well	as	the	requisite	knowledge	and	competence	for	
an	 effective	 risk	 reduction	 and	 control.	 The	 stakeholders	 involved	 might	 also	 have	
different	interests	and	views	about	when	a	risk	is	unacceptable	and	how	it	should	be	dealt	
with.		
	
VRAKA	has	been	operationalised	in	an	Excel‐based	tool	 to	 facilitate	risk	assessment	of	
shipwrecks	for	the	authority	responsible.	Using	VRAKA	requires	knowledge	of	where	to	
find	the	information	required	in	the	tool,	which	is	why	an	interdisciplinary	approach	is	
important.	 It	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 “the	 assessor”	 rather	 should	 be	 a	 team	 in	 order	 to	
facilitate	 assessment	 since	 many	 different	 aspects	 need	 to	 be	 considered.	 It	 is	 also	
essential	to	understand	the	connection	between	the	quality	and	type	of	 input	data,	the	
choice	of	tier	for	consequence	assessment,	i.e.	how	risk	is	expressed,	and	what	the	results	
will	 include	and	represent.	Results	should	never	be	considered	as	merely	numbers	but	
rather	analysed	bearing	in	mind	the	process	of	the	assessment.	Results	will	also	need	to	
be	weighed	against	other	 information	 in	order	 to	be	able	 to	 fully	weight	 costs	against	
benefits	of	mitigation	measures	and	to	make	an	informed	decision.	
	
Many	assumptions	have	been	made	during	the	course	of	development.	As	stated	in	Section	
6.2,	 models	 and	 tools	 cannot	 be	 entirely	 free	 of	 bias	 and	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 model	
constructors.	To	cope	with	this	notion,	several	experts	have	been	involved	in	the	process	
at	numerous	occasions.	A	reference	group	has	been	in	place	throughout	the	process	and	
experts	 groups	 varying	 in	 size	 have	 contributed	 informally	 and	 formally	 to	 the	
development.		
	
VRAKA	has	been	developed	 in	 cooperation	with,	 among,	 others	 the	 Swedish	Maritime	
Administration	and	the	Swedish	Agency	for	Marine	and	Water	Management.	Discussions	
are	about	to	get	under	way	regarding	the	use	of	VRAKA	for	risk	estimation	on	a	national	
level. 
7.6. Suggestions	for	further	research.	
Based	on	the	work	carried	out	within	this	thesis,	the	following	are	identified	as	possible	
areas	for	further	research:	
	
 The	estimation	of	consequences	in	tiers	2	and	3	is	semi‐quantitative.	To	further	
encompass	associated	uncertainties,	a	probabilistic	approach	could	be	adopted.	An	
example	 of	 such	 a	 method	 is	 SIMAP	 (McCay	 et	 al.,	 2004),	 which	 provides	
probabilistic	 estimates	 of	 consequences.	 	 Initial	 studies	 linking	 VRAKA	 to	 the	
SIMAP	method	has	been	performed	(Etkin	et	al.,	In	prep).	
	
 The	 Swedish	 Meteorological	 and	 Hydrological	 Institute	 is	 developing	 Seatrack	
Web	for	broader	analysis	where	the	assessor	can	model	a	spill	released	on	several	
occasions	and	obtain	probability	maps	of	where	the	oil	might	be	deposited.	This	is	
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another	possibility	for	probabilistic	assessment	of	consequences	in	future	versions	
of	VRAKA.		
	
 An	 interesting	 development	 of	 VRAKA	 would	 be	 to	 refine	 the	 estimation	 of	
environmental	consequences	and	also	provide	means	for	analysing	further	aspects	
such	as	the	season	during	which	the	spill	occurred	or	specific	endangered	animals	
potentially	 affected	 by	 a	 spill.	 It	 would	 also	 be	 profitable	 to	 include	 further	
socioeconomic	aspects	in	the	consequence	assessment.	
	
 In	 general,	 the	main	 focus	 of	 oil	 spills	 is	 on	 large	 acute	 spills.	 Small	 and	more	
continuous	spills	are	acknowledged	less	frequently.	However,	it	has	been	shown	
by	e.g.	Lindgren	et	al.	(2012)	that	small	inputs,	resulting	in	low	concentrations	of	
oil,	 also	 have	 a	 negative	 effect	 on	 microbial	 and	 meiofaunal	 communities.	
Improving	 the	possibility	 of	 estimating	 consequences	of	 small	 discharges	 could	
therefore	be	considered	in	a	future	development	of	VRAKA.	
	
 At	present	VRAKA	can	be	applied	to	evaluate	the	relative	risks	from	shipwrecks.	A	
possible	further	development	could	be	to	link	VRAKA	to	tools	for	more	advanced	
risk	evaluation.	For	example,	performing	a	cost‐benefit	analysis	 can	display	 the	
benefit	of	mitigating	the	risk	by	providing	information	on	the	societal	profitability	
(net	benefit)	of	 risk	mitigation	measures.	Multi	 criteria	decision	analysis	would	
facilitate	a	more	comprehensive	sustainability	analysis,	taking	into	account	local	
social,	environmental	and	economic	effects	that	are	difficult	or	not	possible	to	take	
into	account	in	cost‐benefit	analysis.	
	
 Model	 development	 and	 risk	 assessment	 of	 potentially	 polluting	 shipwrecks	 is	
ongoing	in	several	other	countries.	There	are	many	possibilities	for	collaboration.	
Expert	elicitation	was	performed	with	a	focus	on	the	Swedish	wreck	population.	
However,	 the	 structure	 of	 the	VRAKA	model	 is	 generic	 and	 it	 could	 be	 applied	
internationally.	
	
 The	method	 and	 tool	 for	 probabilistic	 risk	 estimation	 of	 shipwrecks	 could,	 for	
validation	purposes,	be	 further	 tested	and	calibrated.	There	are	more	 than	300	
wrecks	in	Scandinavian	waters	that	the	Swedish	Maritime	Administration	(2011)	
suggests	may	pose	a	threat	to	the	marine	environment.	A	selection	of	well‐known	
wrecks	for	which	in‐situ	inspection	can	be	performed	would	be	suitable	to	use	in	
order	to	test	and	validate	the	model	(see	e.g.	Hassellöv	et	al.,	2014;	Hassellöv	et	al.,	
2015).
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8. 	Conclusions	
The	following	main	conclusions	have	been	reached	from	this	thesis	work:	
	
 There	is	a	need	for	a	comprehensive	risk	assessment	approach	for	shipwrecks. 
There	is	a	lack	of	methods	for	comprehensive	and	quantitative	risk	assessment	of	
shipwrecks.	Specifically,	methods	for	estimating	the	probability	of	discharge	and	
for	including	uncertainty	analysis	of	the	risk	estimation	are	lacking.		
	
 A	framework	for	risk	management	of	shipwrecks	is	suggested.	
This	thesis	presents	a	generic	framework	for	risk	management	of	shipwrecks	in	
accordance	with	the	ISO	standard	for	risk	management	that	offers	a	structure	and	
support	 for	 developing	 risk	 assessment	 models,	 and	 provides	 guidance	 for	
shipwreck‐related	risk	management.	
 
 Novel	input	data	is	derived	for	risk	assessment	of	shipwrecks. 
Expert	 elicitation	 was	 used	 to	 address	 the	 intrinsic	 uncertainties	 of	 risk	
assessment	 of	 shipwrecks.	 The	 information	 obtained	 has	 not	 previously	 been	
available	and	is	a	prerequisite	for	quantitative	risk	assessment	of	shipwrecks.	The	
information	provides	an	essential	foundation	that	can	be	updated	using	site‐	and	
wreck‐specific	 preconditions	 as	 a	 basis.	 It	 is	 now	 possible	 to	 estimate	 the	
probability	of	discharge	from	potentially	polluting	shipwrecks	and	to	incorporate	
uncertainties	that	influence	the	risk.		
 VRAKA	–	a	model	for	comprehensive	risk	assessment	of	shipwrecks.	
The	developed	model	takes	into	account	both	the	probability	of	discharge	and	its	
potential	 consequences.	 Risk	 evaluation	 can	 also	 be	 performed	 based	 on	 the	
results	from	VRAKA.	The	risk	assessment	model	is	implemented	in	a	spreadsheet	
tool	(Microsoft	Excel)	to	facilitate	application.		
	
o A	method	for	estimating	the	probability	of	hazardous	discharge.	 
The	 method	 enables	 estimation	 of	 the	 annual	 probability	 of	 discharge	 of	
hazardous	 substances	 from	 shipwrecks.	 Bayesian	 updating	 of	 a	 generic	
probability	of	opening	in	a	wreck	is	performed	based	on	influence	of	wreck‐	
and	 site‐specific	 indicators.	 The	 Bayesian	 approach	 enables	 a	 formal	
integration	 of	 expert	 judgement	 regarding	 potential	 hazards	 of	 different	
activities	with	available	data	on	the	occurrence	and	intensity	(frequency)	of	
such	 activities.	 The	 logical	 structure	 of	 the	 method	 and	 the	 type	 of	 input	
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information	combined	with	Monte	Carlo	simulations	enables	uncertainty	and	
sensitivity	analyses	to	be	made	of	the	results.		
	
o An	approach	for	estimating	the	consequences	of	a	potential	discharge.	 
	 In	 VRAKA,	 consequences	 can	 be	 estimated	 in	 three	 tiers	 depending	 on	
	 available	resources	and,	data	and	the	aim	of	the	risk	assessment. 
 
 Application	and	validation	of	VRAKA.	
VRAKA	has	been	applied	to	a	number	of	hypothetical	and	real	shipwrecks.	This	
study	provides	important	knowledge	concerning	changes	of	results	in	relation	to	
input	 data	 also	 coupled	 to	 the	 uncertainty	 distributions	 of	 input	 data.	 The	
application	showed	that	results	of	the	probability	of	opening	spanning	over	at	least	
two	orders	of	magnitude	is	possible.		
	
 
VRAKA	 is	 a	 comprehensive,	 structured,	 quantitative	 risk	 assessment	 model	 for	
shipwrecks	that	takes	uncertainties	into	account.	For	the	very	first	time,	the	probability	
of	discharge	can	be	quantified	and	combined	with	the	consequences	of	such	a	discharge	
to	 form	a	quantitative	 risk	 estimation	 for	 a	particular	 shipwreck.	A	number	of	 factors	
affecting	 the	 risk	 posed	 by	 shipwrecks	 have	 been	 identified	 and	 are	 included	 in	 the	
assessment.	The	structured	quantitative	model	also	implies	that	risk	assessment	can	be	
performed	consistently	for	all	the	wrecks	studied.	
The	 framework	 and	 model	 developed	 facilitates	 adequate	 and	 transparent	 risk	
assessment	for	shipwrecks,	thus	providing	support	for	reaching	well‐informed	decisions	
regarding	prioritisation	and	mitigation	measures	for	potentially	polluting	wrecks.	This	in	
turn	 facilitates	 more	 cost	 efficient	 risk	mitigation	 and	 efficient	 resource	 allocation	 to	
counter	this	environmental	threat.	
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